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Preface  
 
 The rise of “zero tolerance” discipline practices in US primary and secondary schools has 
become increasingly well documented by the media and empirical studies. Despite the extensive 
scholarship that has emerged from these conversations, many of these analyses are limited in 
their scope and do not connect the phenomena of zero tolerance in schools to the diverse, shifting 
forces at play within American politics and policy today. As such, the goal of this work is to 
synthesize ideas about zero tolerance across disciplines by integrating historical thought, 
philosophical frameworks of punishment, shifting policy goals within the US education system, 
the sociological constructions of “deviance” and “disorder” in the context of the US criminal 
justice system, and empirical data directly from a school district to develop particular policy 
recommendations accordingly. The primary research question of this analysis is: What are the 
effects of zero tolerance discipline policies on educational outcomes? To answer this question, 
Chicago Public Schools will be employed as a case study from which lessons for the nation at 
large will be drawn. Ultimately, this analysis ends up revealing the ways in which zero tolerance 
policies stem from much deeper forces at play between dominant and marginal groups, and what 
comes to be defined as “deviance” in relation to a socially constructed system of “order.”  
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Introduction  
 
“Every man in my family has been locked up. Most days I feel like it doesn’t matter what I 
do, how hard I try—that’s my fate, too.”  
 
  —11th-grade African American student, Berkeley, California (Rethinking Schools).  
 
 
 
 In 2009, a group of a couple dozen middle school students at Perspectives Charter 
School in Chicago took part in the age-old adolescent tradition of a lunchtime food fight.  
It was like any other food fight capable of being carried out by a group of 11 to 15 year olds, 
until the on-campus police officer at Perspectives decided to call in for additional backup to 
deal with the situation. Before long, there was a large police presence on campus to deal with 
the food fight. The police officers then identified the situation as “reckless conduct”—a 
misdemeanor in Chicago—and rounded up and arrested 25 of the students involved (Saulny). 
The students were then held at “[…] the Gresham District police station for over five hours 
before [their parents] were notified” (Bartosik). One parent of two of the eight-grade girls 
who had been involved in the food fight shares that her daughters “[…] were handcuffed, 
slammed in a wagon, had their mugshots taken and [were] treated like real criminals” 
(Saulny). Perhaps not surprisingly then, the same school responsible for the arrests features a 
video on their main website of students, teachers, and even Arne Duncan talking about the 
“warzone” of violence they claim plagues Chicago—all as a promotion for a weekly class the 
Perspectives offers called “A Disciplined Life” (Perspectives Charter School). 
 The story of Perspectives High School, and of the criminalization of what used to be 
considered nothing more than “kids being kids,” is unfortunately not an anomaly, but instead 
a part of a much bigger story. Stories like the arrest of the students at Perspectives are among 
a series of popular news stories of K-12 students receiving disproportionate punishments 
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relative to their “misconduct.” In many ways though, the focus on these extreme cases of 
punishment undermines and diverts attention away from the broader, more systemic, forces 
of hyper-criminalization in America today: entire communities’ behaviors become coded as 
“deviant” or characteristic of “disorder” in relation to the “norm” of the dominant 
communities. Therefore, to understand the forces that led up to the arrests of the middle 
school students at Perspectives, it is critical to look more closely at the relation of what are 
called “zero tolerance” discipline policies in K-12 schools to the systems of inequality they 
work to (re)produce.  
 Ever since the 1983 publication, “A Nation At Risk: The Imperative for Educational 
Reform,” there has been a pronounced culture of fear surrounding K-12 schools in the US. 
Published in the wake of supposed educational declines post-Sputnik in the US, the report 
reflects the anxieties that existed around the US losing its place as a world superpower and 
the subsequent displacement of those fears onto the expectations of American schools.  The 
report claims, “[…] the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by 
a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people” (NCEE). 
Though the focus of this piece was on the educational outcomes of the US on the national 
stage, this report has had lasting implications in a much broader sense: fostering a dismal 
narrative about the US education system as always being “at risk” and somehow under threat 
by some totalizing Other force. It does not take much to see the prevalence of this language 
across conversations regarding the US education system. It has become a popular quip for 
politicians to displace any and all problems that threaten US’ position as a world superpower 
onto US schools. Accordingly, there is a way in which the public consensus on US schooling 
seems to be that schools must be failing. At the heart of all of these fears, though, lies the 
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heart of American competitiveness to optimize “educational outcomes” (i.e. test scores). This 
fear has generated a public protectiveness over the safety and achievement of US schools, 
such that anything seen as a threat to schools’ well-being is quickly thrown under attack. 
Inherent in the narrative of US schools today, then, is a sense that we must protect ourselves 
from some ambiguous, and loosely-defined Other.  
In the wake of increased school violence and threats to the educational outcomes of 
US’ schools, this “Other” has become students who act in ways that are determined “deviant” 
by the state. To be a student who misbehaves within this system that is already “at risk” is to 
threaten the already very delicate project of the US education system. The “risk” has shifted 
from lying within the larger institutional forces driving US education to individual students 
who have seemingly become the risk itself. This risk is still, in many ways, intricately tied to 
the educational outcomes of the state. The narrative is that “deviant” behavior from the “at-
risk” students takes away from the learning opportunities of the students who are “just at 
school to learn.” The reality of the situation turns out to be much more complex, so these 
narratives help to explain the particular historical context that has given rise to what is now 
referred to as “zero tolerance” school discipline policies. Given that the majority of students 
targeted by such policies are often students of color, English Learners, migrants, etc., the 
construction of these students as the dangerous “Other” is a natural extension of more 
pervasive systems of power.  
 Understanding the rise of zero tolerance school discipline policies at the US gets at 
the heart of several, critical intersectional questions of this particular political moment: What 
is the role of dualism in the American political system, in particular with regards to 
constructions of race and “deviant behavior”? What is relationship between US schools and 
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the prison system, and how do school discipline policies reinforce this connection?  What are 
the goals of education, and how do they intersect with managing and policing behaviors? 
How can philosophical theories of punishment be used to create models of school discipline 
that protect the socio-emotional well being of students? Studying the rise and impact of zero 
tolerance policies in schools, therefore, gets to the core of education policy’s intersections 
with philosophical, pedagogical, and political thought.  
 In order to begin to answer these questions, this analysis seeks to perform a policy 
analysis of zero tolerance discipline models in the US. More specifically, the primary 
research question of this work is: What are the effects of zero tolerance policies on 
educational outcomes (specifically, graduation outcomes) in US schools? This analysis will, 
therefore, begin in the first chapter by providing a thorough background on zero tolerance 
historically, philosophically, etc. and provide a working definition of what such policies 
entail. The second chapter will then proceed to provide a literature review on the 
determinants of educational outcomes and the existing casual narratives regarding the effects 
of zero tolerance on educational outcomes. The third chapter will introduce the case study of 
Chicago Public Schools for the econometric analysis of this district’s data in the fourth 
chapter. This will all conclude with a discussion of policy recommendations, based on the 
findings of this analysis and of research on alternatives to zero tolerance. All of this work 
will critically put into question the authority of the social constructions of “deviancy” and 
“disorder” that fuel hyper criminalization in schools, and the US criminal justice system at 
large.  
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Chapter 1 
Historical Context and Framework of “Zero Tolerance” 
 
 
To engage in any worthwhile discussion of the effects of zero tolerance policies on 
educational outcomes, it is critical to first establish a working definition of what “zero 
tolerance” means in the context of K-12 education policy and to understand the historical 
context that gave rise to these policies in the United States. As such, this chapter provides a 
history of the rise of zero tolerance discipline policies that is grounded in relation to other 
parallel, mutually reinforcing policy shifts. The first section of this chapter traces the origins 
of zero tolerance in the context of the media-driven hysteria of the War on Drugs. The 
following section attempts to contextualize these changes within the larger goals embraced 
within the US education system. From there, the analysis considers philosophical theories of 
punishment at play in school discipline, so as to locate zero tolerance policies within 
philosophical frameworks of punishment. The following section more closely identifies how 
zero tolerance policies manifest at a school level and settles on a working definition for “zero 
tolerance.”  Then, there is a brief policy overview of zero tolerance school discipline policies 
in the US, and the chapter closes with an introduction to the case study on Chicago Public 
Schools. The goal of this chapter is, therefore, is to synthesize the many moving parts of 
school discipline policies and to establish a multi-level framework for breaking down what 
zero tolerance discipline polices mean historically, philosophically, ideologically, and in 
terms of specific policies.  
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A. Historical Origins of “Zero Tolerance”  
 
  The political climate that fostered the rise of zero tolerance can be perhaps best 
understood by looking more closely at the “moral panic” rhetoric responsible for the 
inception of zero tolerance policing during the War on Drugs. In his theory on the role of 
presidential rhetoric in the construction of moral panic, James Hawdon uses the War on 
Drugs to demonstrate that there are three distinct phases of creating moral panic. The first 
phase, “Communitarianism and the Call to Action” involves the identification of a specific 
threat, a collective action that will eradicate that threat, and an enemy responsible for 
propagating the threat (427). The ultimate irony of such rhetoric is that it is through the focus 
on community that the construction and exclusion of an Other becomes possible in later 
phases of the moral panic construction. The second phase of creating moral panic, according 
to Hawdon, is “Adopting a Dualistic Model of Use” (430). He suggests that, in order for the 
energy of collective action to be sustained in ways that will become reflected in policy, 
presidential rhetoric (and really, all political rhetoric) must sustain the panic. In the context of 
the Reagan Administration and the War on Drugs, “proactive-punitive” and “proactive-
rehabilitative” approaches were pitted against each other to sustain the moral panic; however, 
as the panic escalated, there were shifts to embrace more punitive measures in order to 
adequately address the seriousness of the “threat” (431). Finally, the third stage of Hawdon’s 
model is “Implementation and the Ending of Moral Panics” (431). At this stage, ambiguously 
harsh policies may be introduced so as to satisfy the fears driving the moral panic and deal 
with public concern. It was at this point in the War on Drugs that zero tolerance first emerged 
in the American political consciousness:  
Expanding the enemy [of the War on Drugs] to include occasional users, the Reagan 
administration launched the Zero Tolerance Policy (ZTP). ZTP, being punitively 
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oriented and based on a criminal model of use, called for the confiscation of all 
property on which any amount of a controlled substance was found. (432)  
 
The term “zero tolerance” originated during this period as a loose “rhetorical device, used to 
signal uncompromising authoritative action by the State and its agencies, against an external 
and internal enemy” (Newburn and Jones 222-223). Therefore, integral to the narrative of a 
“moral panic” is the existence of some enemy whose differences to the dominant group are 
defined in largely dualistic terms. Understanding the nature of the moral panic generated in 
the US War on Drugs is critical to contextualizing the rise of zero tolerance policies in 
schools, because the latter largely grew out of the former.  
  One of the first policies to be specifically identified as “zero tolerance” was the 
“program developed in 1986 by Peter Nunez, the U.S. attorney in San Diego [that called for] 
impounding seagoing vessels carrying any amount of drugs” (Skiba and Knesting 18-19). 
The loose language of this policy quickly spread to policymakers who were constructing a 
broad range of other policies, ranging “from environmental pollution and trespassing to 
skateboarding, homelessness, and boom boxes” (19). The rhetoric of “zero tolerance”—
inspired by the language of San Diego’s policy—gained further prominence under the 
Reagan administration’s oversight of the War on Drugs when the US Customs 
Commissioner, William Von Raab, adopted a zero tolerance approach for the Customs 
Department (Newburn and Jones 223). A similar logic was also at the heart of the proceeding 
presidential administration of George H. W. Bush, who, in his first television address to the 
nation, claimed: “Zero tolerance isn’t just a policy, it’s an attitude. My administration will be 
telling the [drug] dealers: whatever we have to do, we’ll do, but your day is over, you’re 
history” (Baum 244). These policies thrived under the veiled pragmatism of utilitarianism 
that manipulates a fear of some ambiguous enemy to justify the state’s suspension of due 
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process for particular communities of people. As the harshness of the rhetoric of “zero 
tolerance” suggests, these policies oftentimes lack an upper limit, so to speak, on how far 
rights can be curtailed so as to protect “American society” from the moral threat. Moral 
panic-oriented policies, therefore, often depend on notions of Good versus Bad and Self 
versus Other/Enemy, that dichotomize groups into systematically opposing forces. The way 
that students’ identities come to be constructed alongside the threat of violence in US schools 
ends up being no different.  
  To understand the transition of this logic of “zero tolerance” into school policies that 
followed the War on Drugs, it is helpful to put the specific rhetoric that has been employed to 
create this duality into the context of school discipline. Policymakers who have historically 
pushed for zero tolerance policies in schools have benefited from the public discourse—and 
in particular, the rhetoric being strategically employed by the media—that governs 
definitions of “crime” and “criminals.” According to a study reported in 1998 by the 
Berkeley Media Studies Group that involved over 200 hours in observations of 26 local news 
stations in California, 77 percent of stories did not involve youth or violence, but of those 
involving violence, 68 percent involved youth (Woodruff 43-44). These media 
representations “linked ‘teen super-predators’, gang-violence and the crack cocaine 
‘epidemic,’ and all were unmistakably characterized as issues of race” (Heitzeg 5). There are 
multiple potential readings of this phenomenon: either there are internal features of youth 
that dispose them to violence, or there are external factors unique to the climates these youth 
exist within, or it is a combination of both factors. From the former understanding, youth are 
presented in the media as being morally undeveloped and therefore the ultimate sources of 
violence. These representations have tremendous power and have become codified within the 
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juvenile justice system’s formal definition of children as people with “less than fully 
developed moral and cognitive capacities” (Insley 1072). According to the latter explanation, 
there is a level of disorder in the climates “super-predators” exist within that is responsible 
for the violence.  It follows from this understanding that, if this external “disorder” is 
controlled, then the violence will also be controlled.  
  This language of “disorder” can be incredibly dangerous as a policing strategy, as it 
tends to be heavily coded by nativist understandings of race, language, gender, sexuality, etc. 
One of the impacts of media’s control over crime narratives is that they are given partial 
agency over the biases that become internalized in response to the moral panic. For example, 
another experimental study reported by the Berkeley Media Studies Group found that “A 
mere five-second exposure to a mug shot of Black and Latino youth offenders (in a 15-
minute newscast) raises levels of fear among viewers, increases their support for ‘get-tough’ 
crime policies, and promotes racial stereotyping” (Gilliam, Jr. and Iyengar 46).1 In part 
because of these same dualistic media representation, “disorder” has come to be a loose 
signifier for low-income, communities of color, and in particular, Black and Latino male 
youth. In his book Punished, sociologist Victor Rios proposes the phrase “youth control 
complex” to describe what he identifies as “a system in which schools, police, probation 
officers, families, community centers, the media, businesses, and other institutions 
systematically treat young people’s everyday behaviors as criminal activity” (xiv). This 
phenomenon captures the ways in which “disorder” becomes a symbol that allows the media 
                                                        
1 As more of a context on the study referenced, the specific objective of the study was to examine the impact of 
the “superpredator news frame” in all groups watched the same newscast and story, except the race of the youth 
varied between groups. The first group of participants watched a clip in which the alleged murderer was and 
African-American or Latino male, the second group’s alleged murderer was either Asian or white, the third 
group’s tape included no information on the race of the perpetrator, and a control group did not see any crime 
story in their newscast (Gilliam, Jr. and Iyenger 45).  
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to over-hype the effects of youth crime by hyper-criminalizing certain youth, 
disproportionately by race. This “disorder” is easily manipulated by those with the political 
capital to abuse it, particularly in a context where American media has already created a 
general culture of fear when it comes to crime.2 This fear of crime, coupled with the youth 
control complex, fosters a political climate that is complacent with the harshness of zero 
tolerance policies.  
  Understanding the power of these media representations of crime helps provide the 
context for understanding the impact of the April 1999 Columbine High School massacre on 
school discipline policy nationally.  The school shooting in Colorado—perpetrated by two 
male students in the high school—led to the death of 12 students, 1 teacher, and the shooters, 
and became the most closely watched news event of the year in the United States (Birkland 
and Lawrence 1405).3 Columbine was certainly not the first school shooting of its sort, but it 
was significant because of the way the media used the story to construct moral panic: “The 
media framed Columbine as the prime indicator of a growing national problem of school 
violence—quite apart from the actual statistics on school violence, which showed no 
significant increase in such events (Muschetrt, 2007b)” (1407). Interestingly, Columbine did 
not cause the emergence of new federal policies to protect communities against school 
violence; instead, existing policies were just more rapidly and aggressively implemented at 
the school-level, post-Columbine (1412). While Columbine did not result in new federal 
policies, there were still very real consequences on the increased fear of violence at schools, 
as evidenced by the “beefing up [on] school security and cracking down on juvenile 
                                                        
2 According to multiple studies, TV viewers who watch more than four hours of TV a day “overestimate the 
crime rate, the likelihood of crime victimization, and the extent of stranger related violence” (Heitzeg 6). 
3 More specifically, according to the Pew Research Center, 86% of the public paid close attention to the media 
stories on Columbine (Birkland and Lawrence 1405).  
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offenders” (1412). This increased security presence and the fear-driven understanding of K-
12 students as a threat to safety are more difficult to measure than particular “policies” are, 
but so much of what “zero tolerance” has come to signify in practice is this very culture of 
hyper criminalization. The presence of such a culture is evidenced by the fact that “68% of 
students around the country between ages 12 and 15 reported the presence of security guards 
and/or assigned police officers in their schools (an increase from 54% in 1999” 
(Advancement Project 15). Therefore, while “zero tolerance” can be defined narrowly in 
terms of what it means for the amount and severity of formal systems of punishment (i.e. 
suspensions, expulsions, police notifications), these formal systems of discipline also have 
wider effects on more informal system of control like surveillance.  
  In addition to understanding the ways that media representations contributed to the 
highly dualistic depiction of youth preceding the rise of zero tolerance school policies, it is 
equally necessary to understand the special role that schools have historically played in the 
broader scheme of conservative government politics. In The Abandoned Generation, critical 
theorist Henry Giroux focuses in on the Bush Administration, and argues:    
[…] public education has become a battleground and litmus test for conservatives and 
business leaders in their attempt to expand the ideology of the market and the control 
of capital over all aspects of society. […] Using the rhetoric of ‘compassionate 
conservatism,’ Bush claims that his educational reform package is aimed at 
addressing the needs of disadvantaged children, closing the gap between rich and 
poor kids, improving accountability, and offering schools more financial resources to 
improve their performance. (72) 
 
This spreading market ideology is evidenced by the ways that schools have been increasingly 
commoditized into profit-making institutions. For example, at the start of the Bush 
administration, the chancellor of New York City schools proposed that schools begin 
fundraising through on-campus advertising (73). Though a perhaps seemingly innocuous 
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suggestion, this policy was just a representation of a more deeply-engrained mind shift in the 
political climate of America during the Bush administration: “The overt message here is 
clear: treat schools like a pseudo-marketplace, bribe superintendents into turning schools into 
testing factories, and punish them if they do not succeed in raising scores” (73). The problem 
here does not lie in the intrinsic dangers of corporatizing education alone, but also in the 
ways that the Bush administrations’ political narrative caused a shift in the very goals of 
education, from schools being a place to foster democratic ideals to being revenue-
generating institutions:  
No longer a space for relating the self to the obligations of public life, and social 
responsibility to the demands of critical and engaged citizenship, schools are viewed 
as an all-encompassing horizon for producing market identities, values, and those 
privatizing pedagogies that inflate the importance of individual competition. (80) 
 
Moreover, this logic has had very real consequences on the ways that student behavior has 
become monitored and policed in classrooms. Certain funding has been distributed on the 
basis of schools’ ability to “remove violent or persistently disruptive students from the 
classroom” and adopt a zero-tolerance policy for such students (95). The larger implications 
of this narrative is that it allowed for the Bush administration to displace the responsibility 
for the causes of this violence to schools themselves, suggesting that “guns, poverty, racism, 
the hyper-commercialism of corporate culture, and the brutal machismo of American society 
have nothing to do with the problems of violence that students sometime face in and out of 
schools” (95).  
 
B. Contextualizing Zero Tolerance within Changings Goals of Education  
  This apparent shift from schools being seen as a space to cultivate democratic ideals 
to being a place that replicates the market dynamics of the neoliberal state reveals the 
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changing, underlying goals of the American education system. In his article, “Public Goods, 
Private Goods: The American Struggle over Educational Goals,” David Labaree posits that 
the history of the American education system can be understood by the rise, and conflict, 
between the three goals of the system: democratic equality, social efficiency, and social 
mobility (41). Each of these goals arose from particular historical circumstances that reflect 
the broader political factors of their time: democratic equality can be traced to common 
schools in the mid-nineteenth century’s emphasis on using schools to cultivate citizens, social 
efficiency grew out of the growing market-forces of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries and focus on vocationalism to prepare workers, and social mobility illuminates the 
shift to the view of education as private—rather than public—and as a means of fostering 
consumers (43-50). Labaree contends that coalitions can be formed along the lines of no 
more than two of these goals, because attempting to do any more than that fundamentally 
compromises one’s ability to achieve any of goals effectively; as a result, conservatives often 
seek to progress social efficiency, whereas progressive coalitions advocate for a combination 
of democratic equality and social mobility (63). Labaree’s argument relies on an 
understanding that “the central problems with American education are not pedagogical or 
organizational or social or cultural in nature but are fundamentally political” (40).  
  When Labaree’s analysis was published in the late 1990s, he argued that the social 
mobility was winning this value battle in American politics and policy, but also that the US 
was trying and failing to implement all three goals concurrently because of the competing 
coalitions.4 By applying his framework to the Bush administration’s more market-orientated 
approach to schools, one can see the ways in which that shift represents a pivot back from 
                                                        
4 This summary of Labaree’s account was taken directly from my first paper I wrote for my Education Politics 
and Policy class with Professor Menefee-Libey, taken Spring 2017. That paper involved summarizing Labaree’s 
article and then comparing it to another piece we had read that semester.  
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democratic equality goals to social efficiency, in which students are valued for their role as 
workers. This is all to suggest that the rise of zero tolerance has to be understood at the 
intersection of various dynamics—political dualism, social construction of “disorder,” media 
representations of youth and crime, changing political coalitions, and the broader educational 
goals of the US. In this way, it is important to trace how political ideals have been mirrored 
and/or reproduced in the context of schools, because this reveals more about the political 
climate than can be gained from looking at strictly-defined “political institutions” alone. 
Schools can serve as a sort of “ground zero” for much broader political projects, such as 
addressing concerns related to social mobility, racial integration, and the policing of various 
marginalized identities.   
 
C. Theories of Punishment 
 
Zero tolerance policies also exist within a particular philosophical schism regarding 
theories of punishment, so it is helpful to locate them within this context, so as to better 
understand the logic behind such policies. To do so, the two leading theories of 
punishment—retributivism and rehabilitation/restorative justice—must first be defined.  
These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive in the sense that most systems of 
punishment in the real world incorporate aspects of both frameworks in practice; however, 
they are often framed as diametrically opposed and irreconcilable with each other because 
they are grounded in opposing understandings on the malleability of human behavior. And, 
while these theories of punishment have been since paired with social scientific empirical 
studies regarding the effectiveness of different theories in practice, these theories of 
punishment ultimately grew out of philosophical frameworks concerning the meaning of 
justice. Therefore, to understand the role of these theories in relation to zero tolerance, it is 
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necessary to ground this analysis within its broader philosophical context. There are long and 
extensive intellectual histories for both theories of punishment, so this analysis will just 
provide a cursory glance at these theories to ground the rest of the analysis.  
 
Retributive Justice  
The underlying “eye for an eye” logic that drives retributive justice is perhaps as old 
as human society itself. The idea is that, if one causes some harm, one must be punished and 
held responsible for that harm (and even potentially have harm caused to oneself in return). 
Within justifications for retributive justice, there are multiple philosophical approaches taken. 
For one, there is often a utilitarian logic underlying retributive justice in practice—i.e. society 
punishes those who violate the law, in order to deter them from committing future harm. This 
utilitarian, retributive account is ultimately the logic behind zero tolerance discipline policies. 
The goal of punishment, according to such a utilitarian lens, is to minimize harm and/or 
optimize happiness (via the deterrence of future crimes). However, the logic of retributivism 
does not have to be understood through a utilitarian framework. And in fact, Immanuel Kant 
provides one of the most foundational philosophical justifications for retributivism through a 
strictly means-based, deontological account of morality. More specifically, Kant suggests 
that, as human beings, our wills are governed by a “categorical imperative”5 to follow the 
principal: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim 
should become a universal law” (Kant xvii-xviii). According to Kant’s logic, therefore, 
                                                        
5 The notion of a categorical imperative, though critical to Kant’s framework, is not necessary to go into further 
in this context. All that is important to understand at this point is that categorical imperatives, as contrasted to 
hypothetical imperatives, establish absolute moral rules. In further clarifying the difference between the two 
imperatives, Kant writes, “Now, if the action would be good merely as a means to something else, the 
imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as good in itself, hence as necessary in a will that in itself 
conforms to reason, as its principle, then it is categorical” (28).  
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punishing to reach some other end (such as deterrence) cannot be justified because it uses 
people as a means to ends; instead, punishment must be applied proportional to the harm 
caused in order to condemn some action (the crime) from becoming universal law.  
While this is an extremely cursory overview of some of the arguments made within 
the literature on retributive justice, these positions are referenced in order to demonstrate how 
restorative justice models can make both positive and negative claims: “The positive desert 
claim holds that wrongdoers morally deserve punishment for their wrongful acts” and the 
negative claim holds that, “Those who have done no wrong may not be punished” (Walen). 
In other words, the backbone understanding of retributivism, regardless of whether one 
approaches it through deontological, utilitarian, or some other ethical framework, is designed 
to punish only those who carry the guilt of a particular action. If a system of punishment 
either does not punish the guilty, or wrongfully punishes the innocent, then it would be 
failing to respect the philosophical underpinnings for this theory of punishment. The logic of 
zero tolerance, therefore, does not always neatly fit within this Kantian account of 
retributivism, because it often justifies disproportionate punishment and using humans as 
ends to avoid more harm.  
 
Restorative Justice/Rehabilitation 
 
 The restorative justice (RJ) approach to punishment is thought to have originated in 
the “premodern native cultures of the South Pacific and Americans” in which cultures 
“emphasized the offender’s accountability for the harm they caused, along with a plan for 
repairing the hurt and restoring the offender to acceptance” (Fronius et al. 5). The model of 
restorative justice can be understood as a sort of meeting in between retribution and 
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rehabilitation models (Braithwaite 4). Inherent in this logic, therefore, is a focus on the act, 
rather than the individual, as the source of harm. This detachment of guilt represents a 
distinct shift away from dualistic understandings of children as either distinctly “criminal” or 
“good” and are incompatible with zero tolerance practices:  
RJ proponents argue that a strict focus on ‘paying the offender back,’ which is often 
the philosophy behind exclusionary punishment, can leave the victim without closure 
or fail to bring resolution to the harmful situation. […] Such a philosophy [of RJ], 
advocates state, can open the door for more communication and for resolutions to the 
situation that do not involve exclusionary punishments like suspension. (10)  
 
In practice, that means that restorative justice models often entail a trade-off with 
punishments like suspensions, expulsions, and police notification and alternative practices 
like community peace circles. Instead of trying to eliminate students from their school 
communities to “protect” the safety of the rest of the school, this model views all students as 
integral to their school communities and values their well-beings accordingly. This model is 
not unique to the school-context, and has also been introduced at various levels of the US 
criminal justice system at large. Restorative models draw from the logic of rehabilitation—
i.e. that all humans are subjects to particular conditions that cause their behavior and 
therefore they must be treated rather than punished—and incorporates this way of thinking 
into the context of community ties. In order to restore any harm caused by violating these 
community ties, restorative justice understands that the community itself must be treated, in a 
way similar to the individual is treated within a system of strict rehabilitation.  It is important 
to understand the restorative justice model for the purpose of this analysis, so as to locate 
zero tolerance on the spectrum of philosophical frameworks of punishment. 
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D. Defining “Zero Tolerance” Policies in the Context of US Schools  
 
 Prior to settling on a particular definition of zero tolerance, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the various forms of punishment that schools traditionally employ in 
response to whatever they choose to label as behavioral misconduct, or “deviancy.” 
Understanding the relative severity of these forms of punishment helps to understand the 
implications of schools opting for one punishment over another. Most schools identify 
various levels of seriousness in misconduct that result in three different sorts of punishment. 
The first—and typically understood as the least severe—form of punishment is suspensions. 
Important to note is that there is a difference between in-school suspensions (ISS) and out-of-
school suspensions (OSS), where the first method typically involves “a student [being] 
removed from the classroom and compelled to stay in an ISS center for a variable length of 
time, ranging from part of a day to several days in a row” and the latter refers to removing a 
student from school premises, typically for no longer than for a period of ten days (Blomberg 
2). Because OSS is typically understood as the more severe of the two forms of suspensions, 
observing the increase in the ratio of OSS to ISS in a given school district can be a helpful 
proxy for measuring and defining zero tolerance. Distinguishing between OSS and ISS in the 
context of this analysis is also critical, given that existing literature suggests that OSS in 
particular results in students’ emotional and academic needs both not being met, particularly 
for students who are characterized as “at-risk” (4). The second level of punishment that 
traditionally follows a ten-day suspension is expulsion, or the removal of a student from their 
school for up to 80 days.6 And finally, the third, and most extreme form of punishment a 
school could opt for, is police notification. This last measure is particularly important when 
contextualizing the relationship of zero tolerance policies to the trend referred to as the 
                                                        
6 The possible length of an expulsion varies based on the individual school’s policy.  
  
Kaul 19 
“school-to-prison pipeline”—i.e. the growing connection between students’ behavioral 
misconduct in schools and juvenile and adult criminal justice systems. All of these various 
forms of punishment are noted because understanding the relative severity of each of them 
allows one to build a more nuanced definition of zero tolerance. Because zero tolerance 
exists both through and beyond codified state and federal laws as a culture, one can measure 
and define the existence of zero tolerance by the relative increase of more severe forms of 
punishment, such as OSS, expulsion, and especially police notifications, as a representation 
of the broader nature of these policies.   
 Given this understanding, this analysis will embrace the definition of zero tolerance 
proposed in a publication produced by the the National Education Association (NEA):   
A zero tolerance policy assigns explicit, predetermined punishments to specific 
violations of school rules, regardless of the situation or context of the behavior. In 
many cases, punishment for a violation under the policy is severe, such as suspension 
or expulsion from school (Boccanfuso and Kuhfeld 1).  
 
In other words, zero tolerance policies are those that do not always seek to factor in the 
situational factors behind an act of misconduct, and instead apply (oftentimes harsh) 
punishments for any minor infraction of a law. The nature of zero tolerance is, therefore, 
intricately tied to dualist understandings of youth in the context of crime—either one did or 
one did not violate a rule, and the punishment that follows is predetermined. In many cases, 
this has ended up with students receiving harsher punishments than they would have 
previously—i.e. more suspensions and expulsions—rather than non-punitive treatments, such 
as just having a conversation with students and having them reflect on their actions. 
According to this definition of zero tolerance, the scope of such policies is fairly large 
nationally; the National Center on Education Statistics (NCES) has found that “94 percent of 
all schools have zero-tolerance policies for weapons or firearms, 87 percent for alcohol, and 
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79 percent for violence or tobacco” (cited in Skiba and Knesting 20). To further understand 
the scope of zero tolerance school discipline policies and the ways they have become 
codified in the law, this analysis will proceed by providing a brief overview of the policies 
employed federally, across states, and in Chicago Public Schools (CPS).  
 
E. Discipline Policy: A Legal Overview 
 
Given the apparent difficulty in specifying a comprehensive definition of zero 
tolerance, a brief history of policies that have come to define zero tolerance will help to 
ground this analysis. The most notable law that set the tone for what zero tolerance has come 
to mean, and the only one that exists at the federal level to codify zero tolerance, is the Gun-
Free Schools Act (GFSA) of 1994. The GFSA was passed in the wake of the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act (GFSZA) of 1990 being found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
Case, United States v. Lopez (Safra 637).7 Both of these federal laws also followed individual 
school districts across the country adopting zero tolerance policies in late 1989.8 The GFSA, 
passed under the Clinton administration, deviated in its specification of schools instead of 
more loosely defined school zones, and the specific requirements of the act were as follows:  
Each State receiving Federal funds under any title of this Act shall have in effect a 
State law requiring local educational agencies to expel from school for a period of not 
less than 1 year a student who is determined to have brought a firearm to a school, or 
to have possessed a firearm at a school, under the jurisdiction of local educational 
agencies in that State, except that such State law shall allow the chief administering 
officer of a local educational agency to modify such expulsion requirement for a 
                                                        
7 The GFSZA, passed under the Bush administration, made it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly to 
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone” 
(Cornell University Law School), but it was found unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power (Safra 637).  
8 For example, during this year,  “school districts in Orange County, California, and Louisville, Kentucky, 
promulgated zero tolerance policies that called for expulsion for possession of drugs or participation in gang-
related activity” (Skiba and Peterson 373). The specifics of these policies were not consistent across states.  
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student on a case-by-case basis if such modification is in writing. (US Department of 
Education)9 
 
Though this initial wording of the bill clearly specified firearms as the primary source of 
concern, the bill has since been amended to include any instrument that could be used as a 
weapon as of concern. This broader definition of what a “dangerous weapon” entails, in 
combination with the relatively limited power students have in contesting behavioral 
disputes, has resulted in concern over the potential lack of due process available to students, 
especially as the punishments associated with misconduct have escalated. Furthermore, the 
degree of due process afforded to students varies on a state-by-state basis, based on state-
based court cases: “Some [states] provide formal due process, such as a hearing with the right 
to cross-examine witnesses. Others provide for no due process at all” (Cerrone 164). The lack 
of specificity of this law largely contributes to the difficulty in nailing down a consistent 
definition of zero tolerance, because zero tolerance can mean vastly different things within 
different states, school districts, and even schools.    
 Given the range of zero tolerance policies and legal cases between states, it is worth 
highlighting some of the most prominent of such state-specific examples. To get a sense of 
the scope of zero tolerance policies, Skiba and Knesting find that, “at least one component of 
a zero-tolerance approach is currently [as of 2001] in place in over 80 percent of the nation’s 
schools” (18). Furthermore, according to the University of Chicago Consortium on School 
Research, “over two million middle and high school students are suspended at least once 
during the school year. Nationally, suspension rates for high school students increased from 8 
percent in 1875 to 11 percent in 2010” (7). There is a self-perpetuating nature to this increase 
in suspensions and expulsions. Inherent in the logic of zero tolerance is that each act of 
                                                        
9 The inclusion of “case-by-case basis” in the language of the act was primarily included as a means to respect 
the legal requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (Stader 62). 
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violence is capable of providing the fear necessary to increase state-sanctioned violence. 
Within the specific history of zero tolerance policies in the US education system, there are 
several key events in the American legal and political history that are is critical to be aware 
of: 
1960s-1970s: The aging in of the baby-boom generation into K-12 schools led to a  
large growth in the number of students in school, at the same time when 
political unrest was growing around civil rights issues and the Vietnam War 
(Insley 1044). The result was that “school systems began to frequently use 
out-of-school suspensions and expulsions as a way to remove disruptive 
students from school” (1044-1045).  
  
1970s: Nine students “instituted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Columbus  
Board of Education and various administrators of the Columbus, Ohio, Public 
School System” on the grounds that they had not received a hearing before 
being suspended for up to ten days (Cerrone 139). The state court ultimately 
found that the students had a property interest in attending school that 
necessitated their rights for due process (140).  
 
1975:  In the case Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that there are  
minimum due process requirements for short-term suspensions because 
“suspension or expulsion deprives a student so completely of his or her 
property interest to attend school” (139).  
 
1990s:  Leading up the introduction of the GFSA, schools responded to increased  
fears about violence in American schools with “increased preventative 
security measures such as police guards, metal detector, and locker searches” 
(Insley 1045).  
  
 1994:   Federal Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994  
 
1999:  Even after the introduction of the GFSA, some states continued to resist zero-
tolerance policies at the level of court proceedings. For example, in the 1999 
case, Lyons v. Penn Hills School District, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court did not uphold the decision of a school “to expel a seventh grader for 
filing his nails with a small pen-knife because the school refused to allow 
discretionary review of their decision by the school board and superintendent” 
(1054).  
 
Though this is certainly not a complete political or legal history of zero tolerance, it helps to 
provide some additional context for the rise of zero tolerance policies. While there has been 
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legal resistance to individual instances of zero tolerance, there has yet to be any federal ruling 
to clarify the due process concerns for the GFSA.  
 
F. Focusing in on Chicago Public Schools (CPS)  
 
Given the scope of zero tolerance laws across states and schools, this analysis will 
focus in on the case of Chicago Public Schools (CPS). With over 600 schools that serve 
approximately 400,000 children annually, CPS acts as the third largest school district in the 
United States (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”). Accordingly, CPS serves as a strong 
representative case of the larger culture of zero tolerance nationally for a number of reasons. 
At the level of demographic composition, CPS includes a high density of several of the most 
critical groups that are typically focused on in school discipline behavior research. Racially, 
CPS is composed of 37.7% “African American” students, 46.5% “Hispanic” students, and 
9.9% “White” students (CPS).10 Additionally, 80.22% of students are considered to be 
“Economically Disadvantaged,”11 17.17% of students are classified as “English Language 
Learners (ELL),” and 13.66% of the students have IEPs (i.e. Individualized Education 
Program’s individualized learning plans) (CPS). As an urban school district with a high 
poverty rate and many of the most critical risk factors for misconduct in school, Chicago 
serves as a relevant case study for how zero tolerance policies affect educational outcomes in 
one of the nation’s more strained school districts.  
                                                        
10 For the purpose of consistency, I use the phrase “Black,” instead of “African American,” and “Latino,” 
instead of “Hispanic” throughout the rest of this work. There is a lot more that can be said about the choice to 
use each phrase over the other; however, for the purposes of this thesis, I commit to the usage of each phrase, 
largely for consistency’s sake.  
11 “Economically disadvantaged” is a term of art in the CPS data sets that refers to students from “families 
whose income is within 185 percent of the federal poverty line (Chicago Public Schools “School Data”).  
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 CPS also serves as a strong case study because it has undergone several key policy 
shifts away from zero tolerance policies. Three key policy changes in particular are often 
understood as being attempts to shift away from the growing zero tolerance culture that CPS 
has cultivated: the Culture of Calm Initiative of 2009-10 and 2010-11, the changes that the 
CPS Student Code of Conduct underwent in 2012-13 and the Suspensions and Expulsions 
Reduction Plan (SERP) of 2013-14 (Stevens et al. 8) Each of these policies, and their 
relevance to this particular analysis, will be examined further in depth in Chapter 3, prior to 
working through an empirical framework.  
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review  
 
 
 
 Prior to analyzing the effects of zero tolerance policies on educational outcomes using 
the data available from Chicago Public Schools (CPS), it is necessary to first review the 
existing literature on both sides. The theories presented by existing literature—both at a 
national level, and specific to CPS—help provide a foundation for understanding the various 
causal channels that may influence the effects of these policies on educational outcomes. The 
primary research question of this analysis is: What are the effects of zero tolerance policies 
on educational outcomes? Therefore, this section will begin with a review of what existing 
literature has identified as the most critical determinants of educational outcomes and will 
then proceed by summarizing the “big picture” arguments about how zero tolerance policies 
affect educational outcomes. The educational outcome of primary interest for the purpose of 
this study is dropout rates, as this is the proxy for outcomes that will be employed in the 
forthcoming analysis. The review of determinants will serve as a basis for the econometric 
model build in Chapter 4, and these causal stories will be used to help break down the 
findings in the analysis that follows.   
 
A. Determinants of Educational Outcomes  
Race/Racial Segregation of School  
 One of the most reviewed factors of educational outcomes in existing literature is 
race, because it is associated with some of the most pronounced inequalities in educational 
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outcomes. In 2001, the US high school completion rates12 ranged from 65.7 percent for 
Latina/o students, to 85.6 percent for Black students, 91.8 percent for White students, and 
96.1 percent for Asians/Pacific Islanders (Kaufman and Chapman 19).13  However, these 
statistics only begin to describe the full story. There is evidence that the actual differences in 
learning between races begin very early within the educational pipeline:  
At four years of age, between 18.8% and 28.3% of Black, Latino, and American 
Indian children—compared to between 36.8% and 49.4% of White and Asian 
children—are proficient in letter recognition (Aud et al., 2011). (American 
Psychological Association 14) 
 
These early inequalities follow students of color—and particularly, African American, 
Latino, Native American, and certain Asian American subgroups—throughout the education 
pipeline, as students from these groups have poorer educational outcomes through the twelfth 
grade (on average) “and are concomitantly underrepresented in high school graduation rates, 
placement in gifted and talented programs, and admission rates to postsecondary education, 
when compared to their White and other Asian American peer” (American Psychological 
Association 14). However, to look at the effect of race in isolation from other critical factors 
intimately associated with race today, such as socio-economic status, welfare policies, 
migration status, language status, etc. and to suggest that there is something intrinsic about 
this variance in educational achievement by race, would be to tread dangerously close to 
racist and classist cultural deficiency models of education.14 Therefore, this review will not 
                                                        
12 According to Kaufman and Chapman, “Status completion rates represent the percentage of 18- through 24- 
year-olds who are not enrolled in school and have not completed high school by earning a diploma or obtaining 
a high school equivalency certificate,” so the completion rate represents the inverse of that (19).  
13 This data is based on information collected through the Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys from 
1972 to 2001, being cited by Kaufman and Chapman (19). 
14The cultural deficit model, or “deficit model” ‘is the perspective that minority group members are different 
because their culture is deficient in important ways from the dominant majority group” (Salkind). This model is 
often applied to the US education system as a means of suggesting that certain cultures value education and 
therefore work harder, while others don’t, and that accounts for any differences in educational outcomes 
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focus too heavily on the effects of race alone, but will instead continue to explore race 
through the lens of segregation and race’s interactive effects with other determinants of 
educational outcomes.  
 A more specified channel of influence—particularly given school-level data—is 
racial segregation/the relative density of particular racial groups. One of my key findings in 
my final Applied Econometrics paper on suspension rates (rather than educational 
outcomes), “Examining the Effects of Race on Suspension Rates between ‘Low’ and ‘High’ 
Quality Chicago Public Schools” was that, when looking at school-level data for a school 
district as segregated as CPS, examining the effects of a school’s race by percentage values 
alone may not be too helpful at capturing the larger dynamics. Rather, my findings are 
consistent with the logic behind Brown v. Board of Education and that “there [may be] some 
particular effect of racial composition/diversity, rather than race alone, that matters in the 
case of suspension rates” (Kaul 20). The logic behind this suggestion is that the marginal 
effects of a school having one percentage more Black students might be radically different 
than the effects of that school being more segregated and/or having a Black majority 
compose its student body. And, given that “black and Hispanic adolescents [are] 
approximately 3 times and 2.5 times more likely than the average student to attend a highly 
segregated school,” racial segregation disproportionately affects students differently by race. 
This is evidenced by findings that “desegregation plans of the 1970’s reduced high school 
dropout rates of blacks by two to three percentage points during this decade. No significant 
change is observed among whites” (Guryan 919). According to a 2015 analysis presented by 
Stanford’s Center for Education Policy Analysis (CEPA), the particular mechanism by which 
                                                                                                                                                                            
between the groups. The danger here lies in displacing guilt on structural inequality to the supposed complete 
autonomy of marginalized groups caught within larger systems of power.   
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racial segregation matters is exposure to other poor classmates, so reducing the race-based 
differences in this exposure15 might “lead to meaningful reductions in racial achievement 
gaps” (Reardon 23).16 Racial composition has also been found to have particular teacher-
level effects on the quality of education provided in majority-Black or Latino schools:  
Approximately 2 out of every 3 teachers in majority White schools are certified in 
their assignment subjects, whereas only 1 out of 2 teachers were certified in schools 
in which either the proportion of African Americans or Latinos was greater that 50% 
of the population. (American Psychological Association 17) 
 
In addition to these effects, racial segregation can have broader implications on school 
climate, such as “lower-between group understanding and empathy and increased prejudice,” 
“damage[d] minority students’ self-concept,” and “degrade[d] students’ ability to collaborate 
in diverse settings” (Reardon 22). In the context of school discipline, all of these factors that 
influence the cohesion of the school as a community are important to be aware of, because 
they may serve as indicators of discipline practices as well. There is literature that suggests, 
“black students benefit from having black peer networks at school” such that it is beneficial 
for them to have black peers, but not necessarily be placed within black-majority schools 
(Palardy et al. 10). All of this is to suggest that looking at race alone might be less indicative 
than racial composition/segregation, particularly when it comes to school-level data. And, 
given the close relationship between race (and racially segregated schools, in particular) and 
socioeconomic status (and school funding), racial segregation cannot be understood as 
separate from the segregation of students by socioeconomic status because the effects of both 
                                                        
15 This language of “exposure” makes this read as though “poor classmates” contaminate their schools. I do not 
intend to affirm this particular framing of these dynamics, as I feel this linguistic framing of the issue of SES 
and race can be reproduced dangerously so as to justify the inferiority of poor students of color.  
16 Other studies have also found that desegregation can have positive effects on educational outcomes by race. 
For example, in Jonathan Guryna’s 2003 paper, “Desegregation and Black Dropout Rates,” he found: “Analysis 
of data from the 1970 and 1980 censuses suggests that desegregation plans of the 1970’s reduced the high 
school dropout rates of blacks by two to three percentage points during this decade. Desegregation plans can 
account for about half of the decline in dropout rates of blacks between 1970 and 1980” (2). 
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often end up being one and the same. Segregation—and especially racial segregation, is 
therefore perhaps best understood as having a multiplier effect on all of the other variables: in 
highly racially segregated schools, it is likely for the effects of socioeconomic status, 
language status, etc. to be more pronounced, because those schools are more likely to be 
highly segregated along class and language lines as well.  
 
Socioeconomic Status (SES)  
 Accordingly, one of the channels of influence that is perhaps an even larger driving 
force than race is socioeconomic status (or, SES):  
[…] recent research suggests that socioeconomic achievement gaps are now larger 
than racial achievement gaps and that socioeconomic segregation has a stronger 
detrimental impact on student learning and attainment (high school graduation and 
college enrollment) than does racial segregation (Palardy, 2013; Reardon, 2011; 
Rumberger & Palardy, 2005a).” (Palardy et al.3). 
 
Not surprisingly, divisions over who is most impacted by poverty are also largely drawn on 
racial lines: “While 10.1% and 11.1% of the White and Asian are living in poverty, 27.1%, 
34.1%, and 32.7% of Latino, Black, and American Indian children are living in poverty 
(NAEP, 2010)” (American Psychological Association 17). The mechanisms of influence for 
SES on educational outcomes are not, however, only at the student level, but are largely tied 
to school funding. According to a 2002 review by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities: 
A comprehensive review of over 60 statistical analyses that examine the link between 
school inputs, such as funding levels and student poverty rates, and school outcomes, 
such as test scores and graduation rates, indicates that school funding and student 
performance are strongly related. (Carey 1) 
 
Another causal story that explains part of SES’s effects on educational outcomes is also the 
effect of SES on the internal organizational capacities of the school: “For example, 
McDonough (1997) found that high socioeconomic composition schools tend to have an 
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organizational habitus that promotes attendance at selective 4-year colleges above and 
beyond that predicted by the academic and family backgrounds of the students” (cited in 
Palardy et al. 4). There are also observed differences on the differences in discipline between 
low and high SES schools that may mediate the effects on educational outcomes:  
For example, schools serving low SES students tend to put a greater emphasis on 
obedience to authority and conforming to rules and procedures, whereas schools 
serving middle- and high SES students put a greater emphasis on student initiative 
and creativity, whereby promoting differential behavioral expectations that may have 
long-term consequences on future educational and career success prospects (Bowles 
& Gintis, 1976; Farkas, 2003). (Palardy et al. 5) 
 
These differences in the fundamental school culture begin to help explain the harshness of 
schools like Perspectives, where a food fight might become labeled as criminal behavior. 
Because of the strong connection between SES and race, having lower-SES students be 
focused on obedience to authority often translates to cultures of obedience being stressed 
within working class, communities of color that are themselves coded as “deviant.” This 
process of either placing the emphasis within school culture on obedience or student 
initiative/creativity, therefore, may have larger implications on which communities are 
understood to be a threat to “order” and which communities moderate that “order.” 
 
English (Language) Learner (EL/ELL) Status 
Another channel of influence that is intricately tied with race is a student’s English 
Learner Status (EL status). An EL student is a student whose primary language is not English 
and whose schools therefore often enroll them in remedial English classes. The language 
status of students is understood as a critical factor across the literature on educational 
inequality and it is of particular importance to CPS, given that “CPS has one of the largest 
ELL student populations of any district in the country” (Gwynne et al. 9). Like the other 
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channels of influence, EL/L status is highly associated with race and class factors; for 
example, 67 percent of ELLs in CPS high schools, as of the 2004-2005 school year, were 
Latino (10).  Existing literature on EL status suggests that school-level effects account for the 
majority of the gap between EL students and their “long-term proficient” peers:  
Because new ELLs were more likely to attend academically weaker schools, they 
graduated at lower rates than long-term proficient students” and, when controlling for 
differences in school quality, the gap between the graduation rates of ELLs and their 
peers drops from 40 percent to 4 percent difference. (45) 
 
There are, of course, relevant difference even within the group of students classified as EL/L 
between the groups considered “Long-Term ELL Students”17 and those who are classified as 
“New ELLs”18 (50).  While Long-Term ELL students “had the worst course performance of 
any group [of ELL students],”19 those who were New ELLs “did as well as long-term 
proficient students in their classes” (50). The CPS public data files unfortunately do not 
distinguish between these groups in what they label as “Bilingual” (their label for “EL”) 
students, so this analysis will be unable to disaggregate by sub-groups to get a better 
understanding of the nuances of these differences. Therefore, it is critical to look more 
closely at the dynamics that account for the differing effects within the EL sub-group—
perhaps the most critical of which being their migration status.  
 
 
                                                        
17 These students are classified as those who were “[…] identified as ELLs in the elementary grades and still 
had not achieved proficiency by ninth grade” (Gwynne et al. 50).  
18 These students are those “[…] who were new to CPS in the middle grades or high school and entered ninth 
grade as ELLs” (50). 
19 Gwynne et al. go so far as to quantify the particular effects of being a Long-Term ELL student in CPS, on 
average: “On average, Hispanic long-term ELLs failed nearly three classes; had a C- GPA; and missed an 
average of 18 days, or 3.5 weeks, of school during their first year of high school. […] After taking into account 
differences in attendance, long-term ELLs earned similar grades and failed the same number of classes as new 
ELLs; their GPAs and course failures were still significantly worse than long-term proficient students and 
students who were never ELLs, but the differences were small” (50). 
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Migration Status  
 The existing literature on migration status indicates that there are differing effects on 
education outcomes, in large part due to whether a student is first-, second-, or third-
generation, and due to other factors associated with migration status (like SES and race). 
According to a 2-year study that incorporated data from both National Educational 
Longitudinal Study (NELS) and High School and Beyond (HSB), for example, “The best 
predictors of the trajectory of achievement are not those that are based on nativity per se, but 
those that reflect the social environment experienced in the United States (i.e. ethnicity and 
family’s socioeconomic status)” (Glick and White 759). This is largely associated with 
findings that “compared with natives, immigrants (on average) exhibit lower levels of school 
attainment, lower personal income, higher levels of poverty, and so on” (759). Another study 
that also incorporated the NELS data set found that “parental immigrant status is more 
influential than the immigrant status of youth in determining scholastic performance” (Kao 
and Tienda 16). According to the results of that same study, there is “little difference 
between the educational performance of first and second generation youth. Yet, both groups 
tend to outperform their third generation or higher counterparts on various scholastic 
outcomes” (16). There are, not surprisingly, racial differences here as well: “[The] 
immigration status of youth and parents accounts for much more of the variation in 
educational outcomes among Asian students than other minority or white students” (16). 
Despite these differences, though, the differences in “scholastic performance” between Asian 
students and non-Latino, white students disappears when the Asian-American students are 
third generation or higher (17). This is all to suggest that the effects of migration status (in 
terms of generation), one’s race and/or country of origin, EL status (and likely the language, 
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too), and SES, all affect educational outcomes in ways that feed off of and depend on each 
other. This may pose a challenge in terms of measuring the individual effects of each given 
variable. Unfortunately, data on migration status is not available in the data set used for this 
analysis; however, given the clear relatedness between migration status and race and EL 
status, there are other variables available in the data set that are able to catch at least some of 
these effects in the regressions.  
 
 
Disability Status  
 Finally, existing literature also suggests there to be a relevant gap in educational 
outcomes between students classified as “special education” and those who are not. Today, 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) protects students with disabilities 
ranging from speech impediments, to emotional disturbances, to learning disabilities, and 
more (Pasternack 3). While the literature concludes that students with disabilities 
underperform their peers, much of the reason why this is the case is because of inadequate 
resources to best support students with disabilities, and not because these students are 
somehow incapable of the same level of academic performance. In terms of the effect of 
disabilities on education outcomes, the findings suggest that 35.1 percent of students with a 
disability are at or above state proficiency levels in math and 36.4 of students with a 
disability are performing at or above state proficiency levels in Reading (13-14). Even this 
channel of influence is critically tied to race:  
First, African American students are disproportionately referred to and placed in the 
high-incidence special education categories of mental retardation, emotional or 
behavioral disorders, and learning disabilities (Zhang & Katsiyannis, 2002). Second, 
once labeled as having disabilities and placed in special education, African American 
students make achievement gains and exit special education at rates considerably 
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lower than those of White students identified as having disabilities (U.S. Department 
of Education, 2004). (Blanchett 24)  
 
Therefore, some of the aforementioned race effects become compounded when they intersect 
with students having disabilities. Part of this is because of the ways that “deviancy” and/or 
“disorder” as oppositional to the dominant culture: “Educators tend to see Whiteness as the 
norm and consequently the academic skills, behavior, and social skills of African American 
and other students of color are constantly compared with those of their White peers” (27). 
These constructions of what is considered to be “deviant” are helpful in predicting which 
students are most likely to make it through the US educational pipeline, and are also critical 
in understanding the way that discipline policies police behavior. In other words, there is 
nothing inherent or biological about a student’s race, SES, migration status, etc. that makes 
them less intelligent or able or perform well academically. It is the larger institutional forces 
in society dictating who can and cannot be included within the dominant culture that affect 
students of marginalized communities’ ability to perform at the same academic level as their 
peers and not be pushed out of the system.  
 This survey of channels of influence is not exhaustive, as there are other relevant 
factors that existing research suggest may affect a student’s educational outcomes. For 
example, one of the most common variables that was omitted from this analysis was gender. 
It was omitted because the effects variable, perhaps more than others, is much more difficult 
to capture at the school-level of analysis that this work operates at. The primary literature that 
exists around gender and educational outcomes is split between the individual-level effects of 
being some gender rather than another and the effects of single-gender education models at 
the school-level. Relatedly, a student’s sexuality—especially as it relates to the dominant 
culture of their school and/or community may also impact their educational outcomes. This 
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data, however, is much more difficult to acquire for important privacy reasons, and it is 
therefore also more challenging to understand in the context of school-level data. All of this 
is to say that this literature review provides a survey of the most important channels of 
analysis when approaching school-level data, but it certainty does not include enough 
channels of influence to be a truly comprehensive model. To compensate for this, larger 
narrative arguments explaining the mechanisms by which zero tolerance policies may affect 
educational outcomes will be explored after reviewing two potential confounding variables in 
this analysis.  
 
B. Confounding Variables 
High-Stakes Testing Schedules20 
 
The data available on educational outcomes is biased because of the particular 
dynamics of schools’ moderation of behavior policies in the wake of high-stakes tests. David 
Figlio studied the effects of high-stakes testing on suspension rates on schools and—after 
controlling for the factors of a student being a first-time versus repeat offender, and 
identifying a set of month-of-year dummy variables—he found that “schools respond to high-
stakes testing by selectively disciplining their students” (21). The reason for this is that 
schools are incentivized to optimize for highest aggregate test scores, and so they often try to 
remove low-performing students from schools during testing periods and raise their average 
scores. This is a critical variable to consider when looking at the months during which data 
                                                        
20 This section of writing on “High-Stakes testing Schedules” is taken directly (with minor changes) from my 
final paper for Professor Cutter’s Applied Econometrics class in Fall 2016. That paper, titled “Examining the 
Effects of Race on Suspension Rates between ‘Low’ and ‘High’ Quality Chicago Public Schools” worked with 
CPS data from the 2014-2015 school year to look specifically at the effects of School Quality—as quantified by 
CPS’s SQRP ratings—on race’s effects on suspension rates. That analysis serves as a sort of groundwork for 
this present analysis because the SQRP ratings are essentially a proxy for educational outcomes, as they are 
calculated using a series of test scores and factors such as the drop-out rate.  
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regarding suspension rates was collected, as these the amount of disciplinary punishment 
may unnaturally spike during testing period, according to Figlio’s work, and perhaps skew 
the data. Though this measure is interesting to consider and is certainly worth further 
investigation, the data that this paper utilizes is yearly and does not include the timeline of 
these tests. Therefore, capturing the particular seasonal effects of testing schedules on 
suspension rates is difficult; however, this paper controls for some of these effects by only 
studying schools in the same district (with presumably more or less the same high-stakes 
testing schedule). This confounding variable has the potential to affect the documented 
educational outcomes in ways that are not feasible to fully control in the context of this 
study, however, given the limitations of the yearly, school-level panel data. 
 
Chicago-Specific Policy Changes 
 
In addition to all of the determinants discussed above, there are also several key 
changes in the way CPS policy measures “educational outcomes” to be aware of because 
they must be controlled as confounding variables to this analysis. The measures of 
“educational outcomes” in the context of the econometric analysis that follows are dropout 
rate and freshman on-track rate—both measures that depend on district-defined standards for 
what is required to meet each of those outcomes. Therefore, the measures themselves are in 
that sense not static. There are a few ways in which such level of policy change can impact 
the factor of dropout rate in particular.  For one, the measure of dropout rate is fundamentally 
difficult to capture because “[i]t is often difficult for schools to determine what happened to 
their students who are no longer attending classes and to accurately record their reasons for 
leaving” (Allensworth et al. 83). This is a problem, given that there is existing evidence that 
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suggests that “students coded as transfer students have been increasingly lower achieving that 
students who remain in CPS to be counted in the graduation rates” (83). Therefore, there are 
challenges to the accuracy of record keeping that are not necessarily constant over time. 
Existing research also suggests the possibility that “schools [have] lowered their standards to 
get more students to graduate, encouraging teachers to pass students in their classes despite 
weak performance” (29). There is reason to believe, however, that CPS schools have not 
lowered their standards, but instead CPS “high schools […] [might be] enrolling better-
qualified students, or students from more affluent neighborhoods” (34). None of this is to 
suggest that policy changes have a causal relationship to actual educational outcomes, but 
rather there may be inconsistencies in the ways that those educational outcomes are 
measured. Therefore, it is important to control for school fixed-effects and include a time 
trend in the econometric analysis, so as to control for these confounding variables as best as 
is possible.  
While the primary channels of influence between zero tolerance discipline policies 
and educational outcomes have been surveyed, there is more to be said explaining the larger 
systems at play that moderate these channels of influence. Therefore, the following two 
sections will therefore provide further context by including the primary arguments made in 
the existing literature for and against zero tolerance policies (in relation to education 
outcomes, specifically). These “bigger picture” arguments synthesize the channels of 
influence by providing broader narratives under which to understand these determinants.  
 
 
 
  
Kaul 38 
C. Big Picture Arguments for Zero Tolerance 
Removing the “Bad Apples”  
 At the heart of the dualist theory of punitive philosophy lies an understanding of a 
particular sort of “disorder” as deviant from, and therefore a threat to, the norm of how a 
classroom ought to operate. Within the context of “moral panic” rhetoric over the threat of 
school violence and the corresponding sense of risk aversion articulated alongside the 
construction of such threat, any single student can challenge the fragility of this “order.” 
Therefore, because of this understanding of such order/disorder as dualistically static, there is 
little room for rehabilitation or reconciliation, and students must instead be punished on the 
first strike. This logic is central to several national charter networks that have gained national 
attention for their educational outcomes, such as the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP), 
Success Academy, and Uncommon Schools (Rizga). Charter schools such as these provide 
an interesting example of this logic because many of them are hugely focused on optimizing 
for test scores (and other similar measures of educational outcomes), so their adoption of 
zero tolerance policies may provide an interesting story of school discipline policy that fits 
into the narrative of this analysis. One example of this phenomenon is that of a charter school 
in Boston:  
A famous example of “no excuses” charter school is the Roxbury Preparatory Charter 
School near Boston that was founded by Secretary of Education John King Jr. in 
1999. Roxbury Prep became the highest-performing urban public school in 
Massachusetts, according to NPR. It is these high test scores—more than any other 
measure—that charter school advocates cite as a strong argument for replacing 
traditional schools” (Rizga).  
 
Though it is not possible to draw a causal story from this information alone, it is important to 
note also that Roxbury Prep had the highest suspension rate of any charter school in 
Massachusetts that year, with “40 percent of all students and 58 percent of its students 
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[being] suspended in 2014” (Rizga).21 In such schools, teachers and administrators are often 
enforcing punishment for a lot more than carrying weapons. A student in the KIPP network 
notes that, because the school operates using a point system that determines students’ 
abilities to do things like attend field trips and attend their graduation ceremony, they are 
capable of being informally “punished” (i.e. losing points) for infractions as minor as not 
tucking in one’s shirt or not making eye contact with one’s teacher (Rizga). There is no 
large-scale analysis to draw casual conclusions about the relationship between charter 
schools’ zero tolerance policies and their educational outcomes, but such schools embody the 
logic of one of the primary arguments in support of zero tolerance in schools. It is necessary 
to contextualize this logic in what researchers have come to refer to as the “push-out 
phenomenon”—the tendency of schools to suspend a large number of students prior to a 
high-stakes test that was mentioned as a confounding variable in this study (Simson 513). 
This is concerning if one holds a view of proportional punishment and due process, and also 
illuminates the reality that schools eliminating the “bad apples” may not change the 
educational culture of the school at all, but simply artificially skew data.  
 
“Broken Windows Theory:” Punishment as Deterrent  
 More central to theories of punishment and zero tolerance is the “broken windows 
theory”—a model of policing that originated in the early 1980s22 and focused on the effect of 
perceived disorder on crime rates. At its core, this model argues that disorder (as manifested 
in something like a broken window in a neighborhood) is a key determinant of future crime, 
so the primary role of the police becomes to maintain order and “reinforce the informal 
                                                        
21 This compares to rates of 10 percent and 18 percent, respectively, at a national level in 2011-12 (Rizga).  
22 More specifically, this model of policing first appeared in 1982 in Wilson and Kelling’s article in the 
Atlantic, “Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety” (Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy).  
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control mechanisms of the community itself” (Wilson and Kelling). Building on the work of 
the prominent psychologist, Philip Zimbardo, the theorists that pioneered this ideology 
focused on the dynamics of crime and order of communities over just individuals 
Just as physicians now recognize the importance of fostering health rather than 
simply treating illness, so the police—and the rest of us—ought to recognize the 
importance of maintaining, intact, communities without broken windows. (Wilson 
and Kelling) 
 
This logic of policing through symbolic control offers another potential argument in support 
of zero tolerance’s effect on educational outcomes. The crux of this argument is that discrete 
symbols of disorder can have significant ramifications on the functioning of the system as a 
whole. This argument for zero tolerance in school discipline is therefore that allowing for 
even the smallest exposures of disorder in the system has broader effects on school order, and 
potentially learning outcomes. By physically removing students from the learning 
environment of other students, however, the students who are not “misbehaving” will be 
better able to focus on learning the material in the classroom and will not get distracted by 
other students. They are also themselves less likely to commit behavioral infractions, 
according to this logic, but zero tolerance policies enforce strict control over the order of the 
school system.   
 
D. Big Picture Arguments Against Zero Tolerance  
Quantitative Data-Driven Accounts  
 The consensus of the data-driven, statistical analyses on the effects of zero tolerance 
on educational outcomes and continued behavioral infractions overwhelmingly is that zero 
tolerance policies are ineffective. Given that this literature employs a similar methodological 
approach as will be used in the following chapter of this paper, it is helpful to survey the 
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particulars of some of the existing regression analyses. In perhaps one of the most extensive 
studies on the subject, Myers et al. performed a regression analysis on the relationship 
between misbehavior in school and academic performance, using panel data from about 
19,000 high school sophomores in over 1,100 schools in 1980 (21). Their analysis concluded 
that, for students who remained in high school for at least two years after their sophomore 
year, “those who report low grade point averages experience greater increases in misbehavior 
between the base-year survey than those who report high grade point averages” (Ibid. 30). 
Critical to note here is that, though this study is concerned with the same variables as this 
analysis of zero tolerance, it looks at the effect of educational outcomes on misbehavior (i.e. 
the inverse of what this analysis looks at). Myers et al. is still worth looking at because its 
large body of panel data is rare, and it is employed to reveal some relationship between 
educational outcomes and behavioral infractions.     
 A more recent, existing piece of research that is more directly parallel to this analysis 
is Linda Raffaele Mendez’s 2003 article “Predictors of Suspension and Negative School 
Outcomes: A Longitudinal Investigation.” Her longitudinal study follows a cohort of Florida 
students from their second grade year to their senior year of high school (projected to be 
2002) to examine “students’ demographic characteristics—race, gender, socioeconomic 
status, special education classification—and seeks to discover predictors of student 
suspension rates, as well as the effect of suspension on students’ educational achievement 
and graduation” (18). Her study focuses in particular on the effects of out-of-school 
suspension (OSS) and finds that “frequent use of suspension has no measurable positive 
deterrent or academic benefit to either the students who are suspended or to nonsuspended 
students” (25). The study identifies schools’ lack of follow-up to suspensions with problem-
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solving procedures as one of the reasons strict discipline policies fail to address the root 
causes of student misbehavior. More specifically in the context of educational outcomes, the 
studies finds: “School suspension correlates significantly with a host of negative outcomes, 
including students’ poor academic achievement, grade retention, delinquency, dropping out, 
disaffection and alienation, and drug use” (26). The underlying reason why zero tolerance 
policies have been empirically shown in this study to cause negative educational outcomes 
for students is that others students from their classes, and even schools, take away their 
chances away to be fully engaged in their coursework when they take out the “problem kids” 
from the classroom.  
 
Punishment as Stigmatization and Isolation  
 The argument that underlies the majority of opposition towards zero tolerance is that 
zero tolerance comes with tremendous psychological costs that most often target the students 
who are considered to be “at-risk” to begin with. The logic of zero tolerance is that an 
individual who commits any behavioral infraction from a predetermined list will receive a 
predetermined punishment because this sets up a predictable system of punishment that will 
deter crime.  This takes for granted, however, that all students who commit behavioral 
infractions will respond well to the same form of punishment (or punishment at all for that 
matter) and ignores the potential psychological costs. According to a 2014 report in the 
UCLA Law Review, this sort of trauma can have longer-term effects on student and 
community well being:  
Excessive punishment not only impedes learning and general childhood development 
but also subverts the relationship of students with, and their trust and their confidence 
in, authority figures, which intensifies conflicts rather than mediating them.51 
Furthermore, students who are suspended or expelled from school for a significant 
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amount of time often have no access to alternative education or the alternative 
education to which they have access is gravely deficient (Simson 516-17).  
 
What this means is that the students who may already be in need of additional academic 
support are literally pushed out of school with no resources to help them catch up to their 
peers in the classroom. Given that the majority of out-of-school suspensions are used to 
punish more trivial acts (such as disrespecting authority) that may be stemming from “family 
problems, detachment from school, or learning disabilities,” suspensions can be 
psychologically disorienting for students (Simson 515-516). Furthermore, the racial 
dynamics present in many school discipline cases only further compound these effects on the 
most vulnerable students. Standards of what is considered appropriate or inappropriate 
behavior are necessarily value-laden:  
[…] normative baselines represent the fact that the dominant societal group—
whites—will attach labels of appropriateness, even superiority, to its own customary 
behaviors” in a way that uses school discipline to reproduce and reify racial 
hierarchies. (Simson 550) 
 
 It is not all too surprising then that the Southern Poverty Law Center has found black 
students to be five times as likely to be suspended, as compared to their white peers 
(Brownstein). The factor of race in school discipline cannot be overstated and will be further 
explored in the context of Chicago, specially through the more specified lens of racial 
segregation, as was mentioned in the first section of the literature review. What is most 
important to be aware of at this stage of the analysis is that zero tolerance policies can cause 
psychological harm to already marginalized groups and reinforce systematic barriers for 
those students’ access to the same experience and quality of education as their peers not as 
directly affected by zero tolerance policies and racial politics. 
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School-to-Prison Pipeline  
 One of the much broader effects of zero tolerance is that it affects the safety of entire 
communities through what has become known as the “school-to-prison pipeline.” This 
phenomenon refers to two related, but distinct phenomena: 
[The “school-to-prison pipeline”] refer[s] to a journey through school that is 
increasingly punitive and isolating for its travelers—many of whom will be placed in 
restrictive special education programs, repeatedly suspended, held back a grade, and 
banished to alternative, “outplacements” before finally dropping [out] or getting  
“pushed out” of school altogether. The second half of the pipeline metaphor refers to 
parallel shifts that have taken place in public attitudes and public policies regarding 
juvenile misconduct over the past decade. Since 1992, 45 states have passed laws 
making it easier to try juveniles as adults, 31 have stiffened sanctions against youths 
for a variety of offenses and 47 loosened confidentiality provisions for juveniles. 
(Wald and Losen 3)  
 
The school-to-prison pipeline thrives on the increased focus on punishment and the expanded 
police presence in schools that is made possible by zero tolerance policies. With the increase 
in punishment for behavioral infractions at schools running parallel to the shift in the 
criminal justice system at large trying juveniles as adults, there has developed a metaphorical 
“pipeline” between schools and prisons. Furthermore, this phenomenon captures the nature 
of the dualistic representations of children at its very heart: if students are either “good” or 
“bad,” then what was previously understood as a necessity to respect the developmental 
differences between minors and adults becomes superfluous within school discipline. The 
question, for the purpose of this present analysis, then becomes: What is the effect of this 
pipeline on educational outcomes? As it turns out, this growing proximity between schools 
and prisons has particularly negative effects when it comes to educational outcomes, and not 
just recidivism. When students become entangled within the court system, often because of 
their school’s decision to have the police more involved in moderating student behavior, 
“schools often refuse to accept students who are court-involved, leaving them without 
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educational services for months at a time and increasing the likelihood that they will have 
further run-ins with the law” (9). However, even when students are just suspended for long 
periods of time (and not directly involved with the prison system), most schools lack re-entry 
academic or counseling interventions to support these students and help them avoid dropping 
out from school (10). Furthermore, there are numerous “collateral consequences” of felony 
convictions in this pipeline, including, but not limited to:  “voter disenfranchisement, denial 
of Federal welfare, medical, housing or educational benefits, accelerated time-lines for loss 
of parental rights and exclusion from any number of employment opportunities” (Heitzig 6). 
Therefore, when zero tolerance policies become coupled with the mass incarceration of the 
communities home to many of the students most affected by these same harsch discipline 
practices, there is a particular sort of violence perpetuated that places full blame for poor 
educational outcomes and “deviant” behavior on students who are trapped within a system 
largely beyond any of their real control.  
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Chapter 3  
Introducing Chicago as a Case Study  
 
 
 
 In this chapter, the particular historical context of Chicago will be surveyed as a 
means of better understanding the dynamics of education policy reform in the CPS district. 
The first part of this analysis will trace three primary eras of school reform from 1988 to 
2009 to set the groundwork for second part’s focus on key changes in CPS’s discipline 
policy. After establishing these general and discipline-specific policy histories of CPS, the 
third section will provide an empirical framework for the regressions that will be analyzed in 
the following chapter.    
 
I. Chicago’s Context   
 The current school discipline policies in Chicago Public Schools (CPS) grew out of 
the particular history of school reform in Chicago. In a September 2011 report put out by the 
Consortium on Chicago School Research (CCSR), et al. proposes three distinct eras in 
Chicago school reform: Decentralization, Accountability, and Diversification (6-10). This 
framing of CPS provides a helpful way of distinguishing the differing district leadership and 
central reform policies of each era. Analyzing the dynamics of school discipline in CPS 
would be haphazard without contextualizing that history within the larger ideological shifts 
that have taken place in CPS, so it is critical to further explore the specifics of each of these 
eras.  
 The era of Decentralization—lasting from 1988 to 1995—began with the passage of 
the Chicago School Reform Act of 1988 (9-10). The passage of this act represented a shift of 
power away from the central office to local schools through its establishment of Local School 
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Councils, (LSCs)—local governing bodies composed of the school principal, representatives 
of the faculty, parents, and community members (9).23  Councils had a large amount of 
power, given that they were responsible for hiring the principal, allocating financial 
resources, and making curriculum-related decisions. During this era, reading scores stayed 
relatively stagnant and math scores made relative increases; however, the state was not 
satisfied with the academic performance of CPS by the end of this era (25-27).  
 The following era of Accountability—beginning in 1996 and lasting through 2001—
brought back control to the mayor of Chicago to manage the school system (9-10). While the 
local and state government maintained a more “hands off” approach to schools in the 
previous era, this era was the opposite. Perhaps most characteristic of this era was the fact 
that the former budget director, Paul Vallas, assumed the newly instated position of CEO, an 
unprecedented role within CPS (9). There were a number of accountability measures 
designed to improve student educational achievement introduced, such as test-based 
promotional requirements based on standardized test performance, increased probation and 
interventions for low-scoring students, the occasional firing of principals for low test scores, 
and other measures of the sort (9). This era of Chicago school reform, therefore, reflected the 
larger shifts occurring in the US educational landscape towards increased test-based 
accountability. By the end of this era, No Child Left Behind had been introduced federally, 
expanding “state-mandated standardized testing as means of assessing school performance” 
(Alcocer).  
 The Diversification era was the final era accounted for in Luppescu et al.’s analysis 
and covers the time span of 2002 to 2009. The key change that transitioned CPS into this era 
                                                        
23 More specifically, as of August 2012, each LSC is composed of 6 parents, 2 community members, 2 teachers, 
1 non-teaching staff member, 1 principal, and 1 student from a high-school (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”).  
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was the resignation of Paul Vallas and Arne Duncan’s assumption of his position as CEO. 
Duncan built on the shift towards accountability and took it one step further by 
experimenting heavily with school type:   
The Duncan administration was characterized by opening many new charter and 
contract schools, focusing on transforming high schools, closing poorly performing 
schools, instituting new instructional programs, and working to improve professional 
development. […] From 2001 to 2009, Chicago saw 155 new schools open and 82 
schools close (10).  
 
The shift towards diversifying schools relied heavily on the use of data, and it was during this 
period that the city came up with mechanisms to measure student’s progress in ninth grade 
and college outcomes (10). This era also coincided with the introduction of No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB) at the federal level, and preceded Duncan leaving CPS to assume the 
position of the US Secretary of Education (10). Duncan’s background in CPS, in many ways, 
drew more national attention to the failures and successes of CPS. 
 This rise of high-stakes testing is critical in contextualizing the rise of zero 
tolerance—both at a federal level and in the case of CPS—because both phenomena grew 
from the same dualistic understandings of youth. In a 2012 report, the Chicago Teachers 
Union argues: “in most CPS schools, particularly struggling ones, teachers meetings are 
dominated by looking at data, analyzing data and talking about how to ‘improve (data) 
outcomes,’ when it should also be a time for professional collaboration and/or learning” (14). 
Teachers are also increasingly placed on the receiving end of this data collection, as their 
students’ test scores are the primary determinant of their “effectiveness” (14).  Given the 
existing literature that finds that “schools respond to high-stakes testing by selectively 
disciplining their students,” it is not difficult to understand the increased pressure a 
standardized testing-dominated regime may have within the classroom (Figlio 21). There is a 
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way in which zero-tolerance school discipline and high-stakes become mutually-reinforcing: 
districts that have the poorest test results are under the most pressure to perform higher, 
which often is reflected in increasingly punitive measures and “zero tolerance becomes the 
tool used to address the inevitable student backlash from the daily grind of filling in test-
booklet bubbles and being subjected to a narrowed, lackluster curriculum” (Advancement 
Project 28).  It is not too surprising then that, by the third era of Chicago school reform in the 
2009-2010 school year, suspensions were at their peak, with approximately one in every four 
high school students receiving an out-of-school (OSS) suspension (Stevens et al. 1). In fact, 
the zero tolerance approach to school discipline was championed under Arne Duncan: during 
his six years of leadership, the number of OSS suspensions district-wide quadrupled 
(Advancement Project 5).  
 The CPS school district today therefore serves as a useful case study of the national 
story of zero tolerance because it isolates the national shifts that occurred in education 
politics and policy within a more localized context. As the third largest school district in the 
US, its size and diversity reflect the conditions existing literature suggests are breeding 
grounds for harsh school discipline policies. CPS today includes 652 schools, with 480 
elementary schools and 172 high schools (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”).  Because of the 
literature focus on the effects of zero tolerance at the high school-level, this analysis will only 
focus on the data from these high schools. Of these schools, 516 of them are district-run, 125 
of them are charter, 9 are contract, and 2 are SAFE schools (CPS).  In terms of the student 
body, there are 381,349 students in the district, as of 2016-2017 school year’s 20th Day 
Enrollment measures (CPS). Of these students, there are 109,053 students at the high school 
level (this analysis’s focus) (CPS). 80.22 percent of the total CPS student body is considered 
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to be “Economically Disadvantaged,” 17.17 percent are considered to be English Language 
Learners (ELL), and 13.66 percent of the students have an IEP (CPS). These demographics 
are not consistent between schools, or over years, though, as will be further explored in the 
Data Analysis section of Chapter 4. In terms of the racial composition of the student body, 
the largest group is Latinos at 46.5 percent, followed by Blacks at 37.7 percent, and Whites at 
9.9 percent (CPS). These racial demographics do not map onto the racial breakdowns of 
teachers, as is often the case with US schools, particularly in schools with larger percentages 
of students of color. More specifically, White teachers comprise the largest racial 
demographic at 50.1 percent, followed by Black staff at 22.2 percent, and Latino staff at 20.4 
percent (CPS). Interestingly, the largest racial group composing principals in CPS are Black 
principals at 43.1 percent, followed by White principals at 36.3 percent, and Latino principals 
at 15.5 percent (CPS). The differences in these racial demographics between students, 
principals, and teachers are important to be aware of in the context of school discipline, given 
that they may affect what sorts of behavior that school comes to define as “deviant” in light 
of potentially varying cultural and/or racially coded expectations of behavior.  
 
II. Chicago Public School Policy Changes   
 Even prior to CPS reached its peak suspensions during the 2009-2010 school year, 
leaders of the district were aware of the impact of these harsh discipline policies and were 
setting the groundwork to respond accordingly through policy change. In particular, CPS 
introduced three key discipline policy changes that have been responsible for a noticeable 
shift away from zero tolerance policies and towards a restorative justice model in the past 
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several years: the Culture of Calm Initiative, changes to the CPS Student Code of Conduct, 
and the Suspensions and Expulsions Reduction Plan (SERP).  
 The Culture of Calm Initiative (CoC) was introduced first during the 2009-2010 
school year with the goal of improving school climate by focusing on “leadership and staff 
commitment; behavior frameworks; staff development; student development; community 
engagement; and performance management” (Levenstein et al. n.p.). More specifically, six 
high schools in the 2009-2010 school year, and nearly 40 high schools during the 2010-2011 
school year, were provided funds to implement targeted behavioral programs, including 
programs such as “peer juries, restorative justice, counseling, and other alternative practices 
to help students develop better practices to help students develop better relationships with 
peer and adults and to improve overall school climate” (Stevens et al. 8). This first initiative 
shifted the district’s treatment of discipline towards restorative justice models. Such models 
rely on an understanding of child development that is, in many ways, in direct opposition to 
the dualistic understandings that had driven zero tolerance policies nationally and in CPS. It 
was limited in its reach, though, as it was adopted in fewer than 50 schools district-wide, and 
was only introduced at the high-school level.  
 During the 2012-2013 school year, CPS modified its Student Code of Conduct (SCC) 
in a way that targeted existing suspension practices in CPS. More specifically, these changes 
“eliminated automatic 10-day suspensions and required principals to seek district approval to 
suspend students for more than five days” (8). Following in the path of the CoC initiative, 
these changes also pushed for schools to continue to adopt of non-exclusionary practices, 
such as peace circles and mentoring (8). Upon the Chicago Board of Education’s approval of 
these changes, the CPS CEO at the time, Jean-Claude Brizard, proclaimed, “I am a strong 
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believer in limiting mandatory disciplinary actions that remove a child from their classroom 
and school, which, in many cases, ultimately causes more harm than good for those students” 
(Chicago Public Schools 2012). These SCC changes were wide-ranging in their scope and 
represented a direct attempt to shift away from zero tolerance practices. For example, the 
changes further reduced the maximum OSS suspension days to three days maximum (down 
from the 5-day limit) (CPS). It also involved a diversity of other changes, including a push to 
use ISS over (or in combination with) OSS, an expansion of the Anti-Bullying Policy, a 
modification of the restorative justice approaches, and more (CPS). Therefore, this policy 
change grew out of the work of the CoC initiative, but introduced district-wide change24 in 
ways that the CoC initiative never attempted to do.  
 Finally, during the 2013-2014 school year, CPS made additional changes to the SCC 
and introduced the Suspensions and Expulsions Reduction Plan (SERP)— “a plan to 
explicitly reduce the use of exclusionary disciplinary practices in schools” and to “try to 
address the high rates of exclusionary disciplinary practices” (Stevens et al. 8). This effort, in 
combination with the previous policy changes, is responsible for suspension and expulsion 
rates in CPS reaching a record low in 2016 (CPS 2016). According to a publication produced 
by CPS in September of 2016, these efforts drew out an intentional effort to target zero 
tolerance policies and to dismantle the school-to-prison pipeline:  
These improvements also follow a series of concerted efforts by the District to swap 
out the punitive, zero tolerance disciplinary approach frequently applied in the past 
with a holistic approach that works to address the root cause of student misconduct 
and reduce the school-to-prison pipeline. To accomplish this paradigm shift, CPS will 
continue to support and seek out programs that specifically support African American 
male students. (CPS 2016)  
 
                                                        
24 For example, according to a presentation produced by Chicago Public Schools, there were a total of 217 
schools that were trained to implement school-wide positive behavior support systems during the 2012-2013 
school year (Office of College and Career Success, Chicago Public Schools).  
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These policies grew out of the growing body of research literature about the negative effects 
of zero tolerance in CPS. Given that these policy changes have been identified as direct 
pivots away from zero tolerance policies, they provide a useful starting point to study the 
effects of zero tolerance versus more restorative justice-oriented models through data. The 
particular mechanisms for exploring the effects of these policies through data will be detailed 
more extensively in Chapter 3. Given this background on CPS policies, this analysis will 
shift gears and develop the empirical framework with which the econometric analysis will be 
completed.  
 
III.  Empirical Framework  
 This analysis will use school-level panel data from high schools in CPS, from the 
2011-2012 school year through the 2015-2016 school year. Therefore, the effects of zero 
tolerance on educational outcomes will be measured at the school-level, rather than student-
level. The focus on high schools in particular is important because these years of education 
are viewed as most critical in the literature in terms of discipline’s effect on the school-to-
prison pipeline. In a 2015 report published by The University of Chicago Consortium on 
Chicago School Research titled “Discipline Practices in Chicago Schools,” Stevens et al. 
claim, “very high suspension rates in high schools account for 56 percent of out-of-school 
suspensions districtwide. If the district is to reduce the use of suspensions and disciplinary 
disparities substantially, it will require changes in high school practices” (3). Furthermore, 
the channels of influence on educational outcome will therefore have to do largely with 
changes in the culture and climate of any given school and the effects this may have on the 
school’s outcomes at large, rather than providing the context to understand student-level 
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effects of discipline.25 Before involving all of the controls in the regression model, this 
analysis will first evaluate the model that isolates the effect of Disciplinary Punishment on 
educational outcomes. The most basic form of this regression can be expressed as follows:  
 Educational Outcomes = β1Disciplinary Punishment + µ 
In order to better understand the practicalities of this model, it is important to understand the 
way both of these variables, and the controls, are defined and represented by the available 
data.  
 
Dependent Variable: Educational Outcomes    
Educational Outcomes, the dependent variable, will be accounted for with two 
separate measures: Freshman-on-Track (FOT)26 rate and Dropout rate (Dropout). The FOT is 
defined as: “a measure of how many first-time freshmen are, by the end of their first year, 
‘on track’ to graduate from high school within four years,” determined on the basis of credit 
accumulation and course failures. (Network for College Success 1).27 The FOT rate has been 
found to be highly related to the Dropout rate, as “CCSR research shows that freshmen who 
finish their first year of high school on-track are more than three times as likely as those off-
track to graduate from high school within four year” (1). The CPS Data Guides do not 
specify if students who are expelled are counted within this dropout measure. If they are 
counted as such, then any relationship between expulsion and dropout rates that is discerned 
                                                        
25 While student-level panel data would have been ideal here, it was not publicly available in the context of CPS 
and for discipline cases. Given the extensive personal information often included in such data sets, most of this 
data is inaccessible in an effort to protect student, teacher, and school privacy.   
26 The italicized words in parentheses are all the variable names on the regression tables that can be found at the 
end of this document in the Tables section.  
27 More specifically, a first-year freshman is considered to be “on-track” by the end of the year if they have “(i) 
earned at least five course credits; (ii) failed no more than one semester of a core course—otherwise, s/she is off 
track.” Students who dropout in their Freshman year are included in the metric as “off-track.” Additionally, 
students who attend charter schools, jail schools, alternative schools, and/or special education schools are not 
included in the FOT metrics (Network for College Success 1).  
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in this analysis will be biased; however, the fact that this is a school-level analysis will help 
control for some of that collinearity. Both the dropout rate and the FOT are arguably better 
proxies of educational outcomes than measures like test scores, given that the literature that 
reveals the pattern of schools selectively disciplining students with poorer academic 
performance right before high-takes testing (Figlio 21). Also, given the ways that zero 
tolerance policies are thought to put “at risk”28 students on a pipeline to prison, dropout rates 
are a particularly revealing indicator for student’s academic performance.  
In order to properly capture the effects of school discipline on educational outcomes, 
my model will include regressions with both FOT and Dropout and a one-year lag on both of 
the educational outcomes measures (LagFOT and LagDropout). This is critical to the model 
because, without a lag, the model would report the instantaneous effects of discipline on 
educational outcomes. This model assumes that the effects of school discipline on 
educational outcomes are moderated by school culture as the mechanism for change, which 
is not as volatile as individual effects might be. The LagFOT measures the effect of 
discipline on the educational outcomes (FOT) of students who enter the school a year after 
said discipline happens. This is because the model assumes that discipline affects school 
culture in ways independent from individual student-level effects alone. Therefore, including 
both the lagged and non-lagged versions of these measures of educational outcomes will help 
determine if the effects on school culture are immediate, or if they might take time to go into 
                                                        
28 I put this in parentheses because much of the literature about “at risk” students has served to construct them 
as the risk itself, which is antithetical to the goals of this work. Another way of distinguishing such students as 
being completely autonomous over their conditions would be to refer to the dropout rate as the “push out rate,” 
because this places the focus on the forces that cause students to not graduate (rather than placing the blame 
entirely on them).  
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effect—perhaps because the specific groups of students affected by the discipline are more 
uniquely affected by the punishment.  
Because of the potential ways in which FOT and Dropout rates may be correlated 
with one and other, the empirical model of this analysis employs simultaneous equations, and 
therefore runs the regressions for FOT alongside those for Dropout Rate. Additionally, all of 
the regressions include fixed-effects, so as to control for school-level differences that may 
exist, and a time trend to capture the effects by year, across all schools. All of these measures 
are introduced in an effort to read through the large amount of noise inevitable with school-
level data.  
 
Independent Variable(s): Discipline Ratios  
Given the difficulty in directly defining zero tolerance in the data, Disciplinary 
Punishment will be defined in a variety of ways. The first measure, the number of students 
expelled per school (# Expulsions), comes straight from the data set and is very self-
explanatory. The second set of measures is ratios that incorporate the severity of student 
misconduct (by number of misconduct) and the type of punishment (by number of total 
punishments). The basic form of these ratios is as follows: 
Discipline Ratio: Total Misconduct (#)/Total Punishments (#)  
This will be further specified both at the level of misconduct and punishment. By 
incorporating the severity of misconduct into the model, this measure is designed to capture 
the particular dynamics of zero tolerance as involving an increasing level of punishment for 
lower-level offenses. Therefore, this ratio is able to serve as a proxy for the relative harshness 
of punishment schools assign, given the amount and the severity of the misconduct they are 
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dealing with. Low-level misconduct with high-level punishment, for example, might indicate 
a school that is particularly “harsh” when it comes to school discipline, and vice versa.  
The severity of misconduct is based on the classifications of behaviors provided by 
the CPS. They classify misconduct within any one of six groups, with Group 1-level offenses 
being the least severe and Group 6-level offenses being the most severe. One of the key 
challenges of this analysis lies in the inability to know how well the school classifications of 
level of misconduct match the actual severity of the misconduct. Some of the most “harsh” 
schools in the data may therefore not be apparent, if they are more generous in how they 
classify the severity of student misconduct.  
 Because their data pairs up these groups, this analysis marks Low Severity 
Misconduct as Group 1 and 2 behavior, where Group 1 behaviors are those that are 
“inappropriate” and Group 2 behaviors are those that “disrupt” (CPS “Student Code of 
Conduct”). Examples provided by CPS of Group 1 behaviors are “Running and/or making 
excessive noise in the hall or building,” “Leaving the classroom without permission,” 
“Engaging in any behavior that is disruptive to the orderly process of classroom 
instruction,”29 and others (18). Group 2 behaviors include things such as “Interfering with 
school authorities and programs through walkouts or sit-ins,”30 “”Exhibiting or publishing 
any profane obscene, indecent, immoral, libelous, or offensive materials, or using such 
language or gestures,”31 “Failing to provide proper identification,”32 and others (20).33 The 
                                                        
29 It should be clear here that even the language of the CPS Student Code of Conduct is extremely ambiguous, 
and therefore open to the discretion of individual schools and teachers (depending on the nature of their school). 
The language of “any behavior that is disruptive to the orderly process of classroom instruction” in particular 
raises some red flags and is reminiscent of the criticisms of language of “disorder” as extremely coded (in terms 
of race, language, disability status, etc.).   
30 It is telling of the overall school climate that likely peaceful expressions of student resistance, such as 
walkouts or sit-ins, are marked as second degree disciplinary behaviors.  
31 Again, the language of “immoral” or “libelous” or “indecent” is openly ambiguous to a concerning degree. 
This language seems as though it would make it much easier for teachers and schools to become increasingly 
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Student Code also lists “Available Interventions and Consequences” for each group of 
behavior and it is worth noting that “Skill-building in-school suspension up to three days” is 
not present for Group 1 behaviors, but it is introduced for Group 2 behaviors (20). All levels 
of misconduct recommend “instructive, corrective, or restorative response” (18-30).  
This analysis defines Mid Severity Misconduct as Group 3 and 4 behaviors, where 
they are each defined as characterizing behavior that “seriously disrupt[s]” and “very 
seriously disrupt[s]” respectively (14). Example of Group 3 behaviors include, but are not 
limited to:  “Fighting” (without injury), “Forgery,” “Plagiarizing,” “Overt display of gang 
affiliation,” “Bullying behaviors,” and “Any behavior not otherwise listen in Group 1 
through 3 of this SCC that seriously disrupt the educational process”34 (22). At this level of 
behaviors, out-of-school suspensions up to three days are interventions available to schools 
(22). Group 4 behaviors include “Extortion,” “Assault,” “Vandalism,” “Battery,” “Possession 
of any dangerous object as defined by this SCC, direct documented behavior,” “Any 
behavior not otherwise listed in Groups 1 through 4 of this SCC that very seriously disrupts 
the educational process,” and several others (24-25). Both of these levels of behavior list both 
“Skill-building in-school suspension, out-of-school suspension, or combination in-school and 
out-of-school suspension up to three days” as available methods for intervention (22).  
 And finally, High Severity Misconduct is defined by Group 5 and Group 6 behaviors, 
which are used to classify behaviors that “most seriously disrupt” and that are “illegal” AND 
“most seriously disrupt,” respectively. Group 5 behaviors include, but are not limited to, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
harsher with their punishments of lower-level offenses, while working within the same framework that was 
supposedly experiencing shifts away from harsh discipline measures.  
32 It is unclear what sort of identification is necessary here, but one would assume students would need nothing 
more than a school-issued ID. 
 
34 It is not made clear in the student code which behaviors might “seriously disrupt the educational process,” or 
what that even really means (22). 
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“Aggravated assault,’ “Burglary,” “Engaging in or attempting any illegal behavior which 
interferes with the school’s educational process,” “Persistent or severe acts of sexual 
harassment,” and “Second or repeated violation of Behavior 4-13, possession of any 
dangerous object as defined by this SCC” (26-27). At the Group 5 level of behaviors, the 
“request for expulsion hearing” and “Request for assignment to an intervention program by 
the Chief Executive Officer or designee” (26-30). For the Group 6 level behaviors, the 
Student Code notes the ability for principals of students in fifth grade and below to hold an 
expulsion hearing for those students as well (31).  
 Given these definitions for Low, Mid, and High Severity Misconduct, it is possible to 
define the Punishment Ratios that will be employed in this analysis. To capture the particular 
dynamics of zero tolerance as increasing punishment to low-level offenses, the following 
three basic ratios will be included in the regression model: 
 Low Severity Ratio: Low Severity Misconduct (Groups 1 and 2)/ Total Punishment  
 Mid Severity Ratio: Mid Severity Misconduct (Groups 3 and 4)/ Total Punishment  
 High Severity Ratio: High Severity Misconduct (Groups 5 and 6)/ Total Punishment  
All of these ratios will be included in the same regressions, so as to differentiate the impact 
of each of these ratios on educational outcomes. “Total Punishment” is measured by using 
the sum of misconduct resulting in OSS, ISS, Police Notification, and Expulsions. Therefore, 
in order to catch the independent effects of each of the forms of punishment, the regressions 
will be performed using Total Punishment, Number Suspensions, and Number of Police 
Notifications35 to generate ratios. Using these ratios, there will be 9 separate sets of 
                                                        
35 Expulsions are measured as a separate variable in the regression and not included as a ratio, given that they 
are fundamentally different from other forms of punishment in that they result in the removal of a student from 
that school (and that school’s data).  
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simultaneous equations run with Dropout Rate and FOT. To help better understand the 
forthcoming regression tables, each of those ratios is defined as follows: 
Figure 3.1 Definitions of Punishment Ratios in Regression Model 36  
Variable Name Definition  
Total Punishment Ratio  Total # of Reported Misconduct (# Groups 1-2 + #Groups 3-4 + 
#Group 4-5) /Total Discipline (# ISS + #OSS + #Police 
Notifications + #Expulsions)  
Low Punish Ratio Total # of Low-Level Misconduct (# Groups 1-2)/Total Discipline  
Mid Punish Ratio Total # of Mid-Level Misconduct (# Groups 3-4)/Total Discipline 
High Punish Ratio Total # of High-Level Misconduct (# Groups 5-6)/Total 
Discipline 
Suspension Ratio Total # of Reported Misconduct/Total Suspensions (#ISS + 
#OSS) 
Low Suspension Ratio Total # of Low-Level Misconduct (# Groups 1-2)/Total 
Suspensions  
Mid Suspension Ratio Total # of Mid-Level Misconduct (# Groups 3-4)/Total 
Suspensions 
High Suspension Ratio  Total # of High-Level Misconduct (# Groups 5-6)/Total 
Suspensions 
Police Notif. Ratio  Total # of Reported Misconduct/Total Police Notif. (# Police 
Notifications)  
 
Low Police Ratio Total # of Low-Level Misconduct (# Groups 1-2)/Total Police 
Notif. 
 
Mid Police Ratio Total # of Mid-Level Misconduct (# Groups 3-4)/Total Police 
Notif. 
High Police Ratio  Total # of High-Level Misconduct (# Groups 5-6)/Total Police 
Notif. 
 
Independent Variable(s): Race  
 Another one of the difficulties of using school-level panel data, rather than student-
level panel data, is that the data on race that is available is just a percentage composition of 
schools by each race. The marginal effects of each percentage change in any given race in a 
                                                        
36All of these variable names in Figures 1 and 2 map on directly to the variables in the regression tables, so it 
may be useful to read those tables with these definitions handy.  
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school might not capture the effects of race on educational outcomes as much as an 
individual student’s race might have on their individual educational outcomes. It is also 
critical to note that CPS is composed of a majority of students of color, and much of the 
literature on the effects of race on educational outcomes frames students of color as the 
minorities in their schools; therefore, there are grounds to investigate more specific indicators 
for race in the context of this analysis. In response to these challenges and the dynamics of 
race addressed in the Literature Review in Chapter 2, this analysis will not use the Race data 
directly in the regressions, but instead utilizes a proxy for Racial Density.  
 Racial Density is an indicator that has been adapted from the Herfindahl-Hirchman 
Index (HHI) typically associated in housing markets to indicate market concentration. The 
basic goal of this [0-1] indicator is to designate whether a market (or in this case, a school) is 
concentrated in any one firm (in this case, racial group). The HHI used for the Racial Density 
index was therefore calculated by taking the three largest Racial groups in the data apart from 
the White group37 (Black, Latino, and Asian) and scaling the percentage values for each of 
these groups per school to a 0-1 scale (i.e. such that 35 percent becomes 0.35). For each 
school, the scaled percentage values for each racial group is then squared and added up to 
create the index. Therefore, a value closer to 0 would indicate that there is no racial group 
with a strong majority over the others, whereas the values closest to 1 indicate that the racial 
composition of a school is inclined towards one racial group.  
 In addition to this Racial Density index, this analysis seeks to parse out whether there 
are different effects by which racial group dominates the student composition, or if it is the 
relative densities alone that have an effect on educational outcomes. Therefore, there are 
                                                        
37 Whites are intentionally excluded from this index to isolate the effects of concentrated Black and Latino 
populations.  
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(0,1) dummies coded for Black Majority and Latino Majority, such that if a schools largest 
racial group is Black or Latino, then they are coded as “1.” To capture the interactive effects 
of a school being both a Black or Latino Majority and having a high Racial Density index, 
this model also includes both of those interactive effects: Racial Density*Black (Majority) 
and Racial Density*Latino (Majority). This is different from the Black Majority and Latino 
Majority indexes alone because it factors in the extent to which either group dominates the 
overall composition of any given school; a school might have a racial group that is 
considered a “majority” if it is 30 percent of the total school demographics, but the effects of 
such a majority might be qualitatively different than a school that has 100 percent Black or 
Latino students.  To help better understand the forthcoming regression tables, each of those 
ratios is defined as follows: 
Figure 3.2 Definitions of Racial Density Measures 
Variable Name Definition  
Racial Density  This is a 0-1 Herfindahl-Hirchman Index (HHI) for race. 
Accordingly, it was calculated as follows:  
    (Percentage Black)2 + (Percentage Latino)2 +   
    (Percentage Asian)2 
Black Majority This is a (0,1) dummy where “1” indicates that the greatest 
percentage of students in that school are Black. This is 
therefore more of a plurality, than majority, per se.  
Latino Majority This is a (0, 1) dummy where “1” indicates that the greatest 
percentage of students in that school are Latino.   
Racial Density*Black Interaction Term: Racial Density x Black Majority 
Racial Density*Latino  Interaction Term: Racial Density x Latino Majority  
 
Independent Variable(s): Demographic Controls   
For the three other primary demographic controls incorporated in the model—IEP, 
Bilingual, EconDisad--the variables will be taken directly from the data set and not 
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reconfigured in any ways with the exception of an interaction term between IEP and Black, 
but it is still worth clarifying what each variable means in the context of this data set.   
 IEP—or Individualized Education Program—denotes the percentage of students who 
have reported disabilities and therefore receive special education services. An IEP itself is a 
legal document that is designed to help teachers better adapt to the particular learning goals 
and needs of those students (Stansberry). While students with an IEP have more protections 
than other students in terms of due process because of the Individuals with Disabilities Act 
(IDEA), students with an IEP can and do still experience zero tolerance practices. In the CPS 
Student Code of Conduct, it specifies that students with an IEP can receive less punishment 
than other students might for committing a single infraction; however, they are also eligible 
for extensive punishments. The Code of Contact more specifically notes, “School officials 
may suspend students with disabilities/impairments and cease educational services for a total 
of up to 10 consecutive or 10 cumulative school days in one school year without providing 
procedural safeguards” (CPS “Code of Conduct”).  
IEP*PercentageBlack is an interaction term that was generated in response to the 
surveyed literature suggesting that there are particular effects for students who are both Black 
and have an IEP. This variable was generated by interacting the IEP and Black variables 
straight from the data set. It should be noted that this Black variable was the percentage of 
Black students in a given school, rather than the Black Majority or Racial Density*Black 
variables developed above.  
Bilingual is the district data’s name for students who are English Learners (ELs). 
How such students are classified in districts can be a political question, so it is worth 
clarifying how CPS, specifically, defines students as ELs. More specifically, when a student 
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is enrolled in any school in CPS, they legal guardian is asked to complete a Home Language 
Survey, which includes two questions: “Is a language other than English spoken in your 
home? Does the student speak a language other than language?” (CPS “Language and 
Cultural Education”). Based on the results to that questionnaire, prospective EL students are 
screened on the basis of listening, speaking, reading and writing, and placed in age and grade 
levels and potentially placed in the EL program, if they qualify: “If, based on the test score, 
the student is considered and EL, the student will then be placed into a Transitional Bilingual 
Education Program or a transitional Program of Instruction” (CPS). The “Bilingual” group in 
CPS data is therefore distinct from students enrolled in the district’s Dual Language Program, 
which EL and non-EL students alike can opt into (CPS).   
EconDisad is the best proxy for the socioeconomic composition that was available in 
the data. A student is considered to be “economically disadvantaged” if they “[…] come 
from families whose income is within 185 percent of the federal poverty line” (CPS “School 
Data”). These are ultimately the same students that the district defines as “Free or Reduced 
Lunch Eligible Students” (CPS). Therefore, this measure has nothing to do directly about 
school funding or the resources available at a given school. Given the close relationship 
between students’ socioeconomic status and the resources available to their school, though, 
these are very interrelated concepts.   
While the definition for each of the demographic control variables is fairly straight 
forward, they will be summarized by the following definitions as a more accessible reference 
point for understanding the regression tables. The variable names listed for each variables 
map on directly to the variable names on the regression tables (Table 2; Table 3; Table 4; 
Table 5). These definitions are as follows:  
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Figure 3.3 Definitions of Demographic Control Measures 
Variable Name Definition  
IEP Percentage of students in a school with part of the 
Individualized Education Program; proxy for special 
education/students with a disability  
Bilingual  Percentage of students in a school for whom English is not 
their primary language  
EconDisad Percentage of students in a school who are considered 
“economically disadvantaged”  
IEP*PercentageBlack  Interaction term between the Percentage of Students with an 
IEP and the Percentage of Black students in a school  
 
 
 
Setting up Regression Model  
From these definitions, it is possible to build up the regression model. The first 
regression will be as follows:  
(1) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio + β2# 
Expelled + β2Time Trend+ µ 
 
This sets a baseline for the model by excluding all of the various controls and looking first to 
see if there is any relationship between Disciplinary Punishment and Educational Outcomes, 
all other controls withstanding, except for the Time Trend and the fixed effects. It is 
important to note here that, in building up the full regression model, I only use the Total 
Punishment Ratio, and do not disaggregate it by level of misconduct or level of punishment 
(i.e. any of the other ratios included in Figure 3.1). Only after that full model is build up will 
be applied to each of the different punishment ratios (for the sake of not including an 
excessive number of tables). The predicted results of these models are explored more in 
depth in the following section.  
Given this initial regression, it is possible to build the model up. There are two sets of 
controls – Race and Demographics (i.e. Bilingual, IEP, and Economically Disadvantaged). 
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These sets of controls will be introduced separately in the regression model before both being 
included in the complete model. Black students have been found to be three times as likely to 
be suspended than their white peers, so they are a critical group to consider in questions of 
race and suspension rates (Morris and Perry 70). Furthermore, a study performed by The 
Civil Rights Project at UCLA found that 10.8 percent of Latino students are suspended, 
compared to only 6.7 percent of White students and 2.5 percent of Asian students (Losen et 
al. 4). Therefore, these racial categories are the most represented in the data and existing data 
suggests they are either highly represented (i.e. in the case of Blacks and Latinos) in the pool 
of suspended students, or not represented that much (i.e. in the case of Whites).38 The second 
set of regressions will accordingly be as follows: 
(2) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio+ + β2# 
Expelled + β3# Time Trend + β4Black+ β5 Latino + µ 
 
Based on existing literature, I expect both racial categories will have a negative relationship 
with educational outcomes. The Black and Latino variables both reflect the percentage of 
students in a school of that respective racial identity. Therefore, I expect an increase in either 
of these variables to be associated with a negative change in FOT and a positive change in 
Dropout. Given the problems with using these straight percentage values, rather than the 
Racial Density indexes though, I expect the race-effects at this level of the model will not be 
as pronounced as they might be one the Racial Density measure is incorporated.  
 After testing these racial variables directly, the Racial Density measures will be 
introduced. So as to avoid collinearity, the original measures of Race (by percentage) will be 
taken out from the regressions.  
                                                        
38 The majority of this paragraph (i.e. the references to existing literature) are taken from my Applied 
Econometrics paper, “Examining the Effects of Race on Suspension Rate between ‘Low’ and ‘High’ Quality 
Chicago Public Schools.” 
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(3) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio+ β2# 
Expelled+ β3Time Trend + β4Racial Density + β5BlackMaj + β6LatinoMaj + 
β7Racial Density*BlackMaj+ β8Racial Density*LatinoMaj + µ 
 
Based on existing literature, I expect Racial Density*BlackMaj and Racial 
Density*LatinoMaj to both have negative relationships with Educational Outcomes (i.e. a 
negative relationship with FOT and positive relationship with Dropout). I predict that these 
values are more economically significant than either of the straight race measures, Black or 
Latino, because they capture the more specific dynamics that might affect educational 
outcomes at a school-level. It is unclear how Racial Density might affect educational 
outcomes by itself; however, given that the overall make-up of CPS is primarily students of 
color, a high Racial Density is likely to be relatively correlated with either BlackMaj or 
LatinoMaj, so it seems likely that the Racial Density index is also associated with negative 
educational outcomes.  
 The next regression will also build off of the initial regression, this time by including 
the Demographic Controls—Economically Disadvantaged, IEP, and Bilingual. Like the 
Race controls, each of these controls captures the percentage of each school composed of 
students who are economically disadvantaged, have an IEP, and are bilingual (respectively). 
The model for this set of regressions is as follows.  
(4) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio+ β2# 
Expelled + β3Time Trend + β4IEP+ β5Bilingual + β6EconDisad+ µ 
 
These measures are introduced without the Race variables at first, so as to first evaluate their 
independent effects on Educational Outcomes. Based on existing literature, I would expect 
schools with higher percentages of Economically Disadvantaged students, students with 
IEPs, and Bilingual students to have poorer educational outcomes. In the case of these 
demographic controls, the causal mechanisms that might mediate these effects on educational 
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outcomes is the access to educational resources and/or school quality. Something worth 
noting is that many of the students with an IEP potentially classify for protections under the 
Individuals for Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)—depending on their particular learning 
and/or developmental needs—which would affect the level of due process they receive in 
disciplinary cases. Therefore, the IEP variable may affect Educational Outcomes in ways that 
are less mediated through discipline than other variables, such as race.  
After having identified the independent effects of both sets of controls, the following 
regression model will include all controls:  
(5) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1Total Punishment Ratio + β2# 
Expelled + β3Time Trend + β4Racial Density + β5BlackMaj + β6IEP + β7Bilingual + 
β8EconDisad+ + β9EconDisad + β10Racial Density*BlackMaj + 
β11IEP*PercentageBlack + µ  
 
All of these regressions will be performed using cross-sectional data controlling for fixed-
effects, so the model attempts to control for any potential school-level constants. LatinoMaj 
and its interaction term with Racial Density are both removed from this fifth regression in 
order to control for multi-collinearity. The Latino variable and Bilingual are highly positively 
correlated, with a correlational coefficient of 0.7285, so removing the Latino variables serves 
as an attempt to control for this problem. It does over-simplify the model in not including 
these variables in some ways, but Bilingual was more relevant to the model (i.e. more 
economically and statistically significant in the regressions), so it was more critical to include 
that channel of influence.  
 Finally, the last regression of the foundational model for this analysis is the fifth 
regression, except using a 1-year lag for both Educational Outcome measures:  
(6) 1-Year Lagged Educational Outcomes (LagDropout, LagFOT) = β1Total 
Punishment Ratio + β2# Expelled + β3Time Trend + β4Racial Density + β5BlackMaj 
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+ β6IEP + β7Bilingual + β8EconDisad+ + β9EconDisad + β10Racial 
Density*BlackMaj + IEP*PercentageBlack + µ 
 
This regression is included in order to account for the effects of discipline on educational 
outcomes that might be the instantaneous results of changes in school culture. For example, if 
a large number of students are notified to the police in one year, this lag would capture the 
longer-term effects of that punishment on the overall school’s dropout rate and Freshman 
On-Track rate.  
Given this full model, I will then apply the final regressions—Regressions 5 and 6—
with each of the various punishment levels defined in Figure 3.1. In other words, the 
punishment ratios for Total Punishment, Suspension, and Police Notification will each be 
regressed using the ratios that include total misconduct, as well as the disaggregated levels of 
misconduct. The basic forms of non-lagged and lagged regressions that are disaggregated by 
punishment ratios are as follows: 
(7) Educational Outcomes (Dropout, FOT) = β1LowPunishRatio + 
β2MidPunishRatio + β3HighPunishRatio + β4# Expelled + β5Time Trend + β6Racial 
Density + β7BlackMaj + β8IEP + β9Bilingual + β10EconDisad+ β11EconDisad + 
β12Racial Density*BlackMaj + β13IEP*PercentageBlack + µ  
 
(8) 1-Year Lagged Educational Outcomes (LagDropout, LagFOT) = 
β1LowPunishRatio + β2MidPunishRatio + β3HighPunishRatio + β4# Expelled + 
β5Time Trend + β6Racial Density + β7BlackMaj + β8IEP + β9Bilingual + 
β10EconDisad+ β11EconDisad + β12Racial Density*BlackMaj + 
β13IEP*PercentageBlack + µ  
 
Therefore, for each form of punishment, there will be 8 total regressions: total 
misconduct ratios un-lagged and lagged and disaggregated misconduct ratios un-lagged and 
lagged, for both Dropout and FOT. These numbered regressions correspond directly to the 
basic form used for the numbered regressions on the regression tables; the only difference is 
that Total Punish Ratio is replaced with Suspension Ratio and Police Notif. Ratio, and their 
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disaggregated correlates, in the other regressions (Table 4; Table 5). The full regressions for 
Total Punishment are not included in Table 1 with the rest of the build-up for the model, and 
are instead included in Table 2 with the rest of the full regressions for Total Punishment. The 
full breakdown of regressions performed for this analysis will become clearer in the 
regression tables. 
 Given these models, I expect the findings using the lagged educational outcomes to 
be more significant than the non-lagged outcomes because they will better capture the 
aggregated student effects and the more ambiguous measure of instantaneous “changes in 
school culture.” The literature review also provides context to believe that race will be 
significant (Black; Latino; BlackMaj; LatinoMaj), but that the proxy for racial segregation 
(Racial Density) will be more significant when it is interacted with these same race variables 
(Racial Density*BlackMaj). It is difficult to make predictions regarding whether dropout 
rates or the FOT will be better accounted for by the model; however, given that FOT is an 
index that is created whereas dropout rates are a more binary indicator for which marginal 
changes have more profound impacts on a school, I predict dropout rates to be a better 
indicator of educational outcomes in this model. I also expect all findings regarding the 
demographic controls to be in line with the conclusions of existing literature—that is, having 
a higher density of students with an IEP, who are ELs, and who are economically 
disadvantaged will be associated with worse educational outcomes for a school. Finally, the 
key question of this analysis whether or not zero tolerance policies (measured by the 
punishment ratios) will have a negative or positive effect on educational outcomes. I predict 
that the “harsher” a school is, the less effective their punishment will be. In other words, if a 
school has a low level of misconducts but still opts for a high level of punishment, then that 
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school is employing harsher discipline policies and I expect there to reach a point in the 
disaggregated punishment ratios (i.e. low, mid, high) where punishment begins to be 
associated with negative, rather than positive, education outcomes. This is to suggest that 
punishment is not categorically bad (for educational outcomes, and otherwise), but 
disproportionately harsh punishments are.  
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Chapter 4  
Findings from Chicago Public Schools 
 
 
 
 Given this background on Chicago and the existing literature, it is possible to look 
more closely at the data available from Chicago Public Schools. This chapter will begin with 
an analysis of the data in question to pick up any initial trends and make predictions on the 
potential findings of the model. The second section will detail the findings from the 
regression, and will be followed by the third section, which discusses some of the potential 
shortfalls of this particular data set. Finally, this chapter will conclude with potential take-
away lessons for the US education system at large. The following chapter will draw 
conclusions for the nation and large and suggest policy recommendations accordingly.  
 
I. Data Analysis  
 This analysis will employ data from the Chicago Public School (CPS) District’s 
public school data files from the 2011-2012 through 2015-2016 school years. More 
specifically, this analysis pulls data from the “Limited English Proficiency, Special Ed, Low 
Income, IEP,” “Dropout and Graduation,” “Freshman On-Track,” and “Suspensions and 
Expulsions” sub-reports for each school year. The information in these data sets was 
collected through the forms CPS requires all students’ guardians fill out at the start of every 
school year. Each observation within these data sets represents one school (K-12); 
accordingly, the demographic-based variables (e.g. bilingual status, special education status, 
economic status, and racial categories) are all represented with a percentage value that 
  
Kaul 74 
represents the percentage of students with that particular demographic feature at that 
particular school.39  
 The central research question of this analysis is: What is the impact of zero tolerance 
policies on two specific educational outcomes (dropout rates and Freshman On-track rate) in 
K-12 schools in the United States? Given the scope of this data, this case study will be 
necessarily limited to Chicago Public Schools. Furthermore, because the educational 
outcomes that are of most interest in the context of the school-to-prison pipeline are dropout 
rates and the Freshman On-Track rates, this naturally reduces the scope of this case study to 
be focused on high schools in CPS. Given that the literature on zero tolerance and the school-
to-prison pipeline in particular are focused on the impact of punishment at these later 
outcomes in K-12 education, this focus fits naturally into the existing literature’s causal 
story. Therefore, this case study will ask a slightly more refined research question, that is: 
What is the impact of zero tolerance policies on dropout rates and the Freshman On-track 
rate in high schools in the Chicago Public Schools district, and what do these findings reveal 
about the larger national story of zero tolerance and educational outcomes? Therefore, 
following the specific analysis of high schools in CPS, this analysis will seek to draw 
connections to the national context of the US education system.   
  A first take at analyzing the summary statistics of this data by school year, reveals a 
few things of note. For one, the mean percentage of misconduct that resulted in OSS (43.339 
%) vastly exceeded the percentage of misconduct that resulted in ISS in the 2011-2012 
school year (29.2%) (Table 1). This is significant, given that OSS is typically understood as 
the harsher form of suspension, given that it forces students physically outside of their school 
                                                        
39 Some of the wording of this paragraph was borrowed from the Applied Econometrics paper I wrote in Fall 
2016, “Examining the Effects of Race on Suspension Rates between ‘Low’ and ‘High’ Quality Public Schools.”  
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communities. However, when these rates are graphed over time, it is interesting to see them 
to change fairly proportionate to one and other, despite discipline policy changes during this 
time in CPS (Figure 4.1). Perhaps this reveals the impacts of such changes were more 
realized among other forms of punishment.  
Figure 4.1 Mean OSS and ISS Rates   Figure 4.2 Mean Numbers of 
Over Time40       Misconduct by Severity over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is worth noting, also, that the amount of misconduct being reported in CPS during the time 
period of interest in this analysis remained fairly constant for Mid- and High-level of 
misconduct; however, there was a spike in Low-level misconduct (Figure 4.2). This may be 
due to genuine changes in the behavior of students, or perhaps due to increased policing of 
low-level misconduct during this time. It is not possible to discern that causal story from this 
figure alone though.  
Another interesting trend to note that is consistent with what one would expect from 
the policy changes and existing literature on CPS is that the average number of Expulsions 
per one hundred students has consistently decreased over time (Figure 4.3). This measure is 
                                                        
40 While the graph designates each school year with only one year, it should be noted that “2011” indicates 
“2011-2012 school year,” “2012” indicates “2012-2013 school year,” and so on. Therefore, the full range of 
data being represented is 2011-2016, and not 2011-2015, as may seem more intuitive, given the graph.  
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on a different scale than the “PerISS” and “PerOSS” measurements, as the latter 
measurements are percentages and the Expulsion measure is an average. All of these 
measurements may also have overlap in the students receiving any given form of punishment 
as well—i.e. none of these measurements attempt to capture the number of unique students 
who receive any of the given forms of punishment.  
Figure 4.3 Mean Numbers of Expulsions per 100 Students41 Over Time (2011-2016)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This graphically represents the changes in one of the strictest forms of disciplinary 
punishment available to schools. It helps to contextualize the Suspensions and Expulsions 
Reduction Plan (SERP), in particular. Introduced in February 2013, this policy that focused 
on targeted reductions in the suspension and expulsion rates. Reading Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in 
relation to one and other might reveal that SERP was indeed successful at reducing 
suspensions, even though that is not apparent in Figure 4.1 alone; if there was an increase in 
misconduct (as Figure 4.2 suggests) alongside relatively constant suspension practices (as 
Figure 4.1 suggests), then it is entirely possible that schools were in fact becoming less strict 
                                                        
41 The regression work of this analysis uses a slightly different measure of expulsions: the total number of 
expulsions per school; however this measure of average expulsions per 100 students provides a better picture of 
the scaled changes across the district over time.  
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with punishment during this time and there were simply increases in behavioral misconduct. 
None of these observed trends in the data are too surprising, but it is helpful to see the 
particular effects of CPS’s policy changes manifested in their actual suspension and 
expulsion numbers.  
 Another important trend that becomes apparent through a graphical analysis of the 
data set is the relative changes in the educational outcomes—FOT rates and dropout rates—
over time. The FOT rates and Dropout rates are measuring opposite ends of educational 
outcomes—i.e. the higher the FOT, the better the educational outcomes of first year high 
school students (whereas the inverse is true for the dropout rate).   
Figure 4.4 Mean FOT Rates Over Time Figure 4.5 Mean Dropout Rates Over 
Time 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Though it is not possible to establish any causal story based on these descriptive stats, there 
is reason to further investigate the relationship between FOT rates and dropout rates, given 
that they are also strongly negatively correlated with a correlational coefficient of -0.5940. It 
is notable that the FOT rate drops in the same year that the dropout rate is at its peak. It 
seems plausible that the decreases in the FOT rate and increases in the dropout rate may have 
similar causal mechanisms—i.e. similar changing conditions in schools may be responsible 
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for both changes. It is perhaps relevant to note that the 2014-2015 school year is the same 
one where there was an observed flip between the percentages of misconduct that result in an 
OSS versus an ISS.  
 Furthermore, it is worth investigating the spread of the distribution for the use of 
various punishments across schools to better contextualize the data because the preceding 
time trends concerned with changes in discipline police (Figure 4.1; Figure 4.3) rely on 
yearly means across all schools. This aggregated view of the data provides a better scope of 
the range of disciplinary practice used across the district and the relative distributions of each 
form of punishment being employed by schools.  
Figure 4.6 Distributions of Percentage of Misconducts Resulting in ISS, OSS, and Police 
Notification42  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the most limited form of punishment employed by schools in the data set is police 
notification, there appear to be a number of outlier schools with very high levels of police 
notification of misconduct (Figure 4.6). This distribution is helpful in visualizing the spread 
                                                        
42 Expulsions were excluded from this box plot because, while all three of these measures were calculated in 
terms of the percentage of misconduct that resulted in each form of punishment, the expulsion measurement in 
the data set is the number of expulsions per 100 students. These are fundamentally non-analogous measures, so 
it did not make sense to have them plotted using the same y-axis.  
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of data; however, looking at the distribution of such punishments in relation to particular 
levels of punishment would be even more helpful. This level of data is unfortunately not 
disaggregated in the data set though.  
To better understand the relation between punishment and actual behavioral 
misconduct, it is helpful to look more closely at the ratios of misconduct over punishment. 
Again, these measures were created in an effort to capture the degree to which a school is 
“zero tolerance”—i.e. a value of “1” would indicate that a school administers a suspension, 
expulsion, or police notification for every behavioral misconduct. A higher ratio, therefore, 
indicates that a higher number of behavioral misconduct/infractions are not resulting in ISS, 
OSS, expulsion, or police notification. It is possible that this gap between total misconduct 
and total punishment is being addressed through less punitive measures (perhaps restorative 
justice models), but it is not possible to be sure, given this particular graphical representation 
of the data and what is available in the data set.  
 
Figure 4.7 Mean Total Punishment Ratio over Time  
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It is interesting to note that the mean Total Punishment Ratio goes up after 2013, the year the 
Student Code of Conduct was modified (Figure 4.7). Given that these changes were designed 
to minimize the use of punitive measures used by schools and to shift more towards 
alternative methods of treatment like peace circles, this might explain the fact that there was 
a higher amount of misconduct that was not resulting in ISS, OSS, expulsion, or police 
notification after 2013. The change the in the mean Total Punishment ratio, however, is not 
particularly large though, which may have to do with the fact that such changes in the Code 
of Conduct may have affected different schools to different degrees (i.e. schools who 
previously used harsher methods of punishment would be forced to change their practices 
more than a school that did not) (Table 1).  
In terms of changes in the composition of the student body, there are also several 
interesting things to note. The three features of the student body that analysis will control for 
(beyond racial measures) are the percentages of students who are bilingual, with an IEP, and 
who are economically disadvantaged, as these may affect the educational outcomes at the 
school-level. Changes in each of these demographic groups over time may, therefore, help 
understand the regression analysis, in relation to policy changes in CPS. In order to 
understand any potential trends that may exist, over time or across schools, for each of these 
three demographic controls, it is useful to look at their distributions and mean values (across 
the district) over time. These figures will provide a better context for demographic shifts 
within the city of Chicago itself.   
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Figure 4.8 Mean Percentage of Students with     Figure 4.9 Histogram of Percentage  
 an IEP over Time         Students with an IEP per School 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firstly, the mean percentage of students who have an IEP across CPS has increased 
by over a percentage point between the 2011-2012 and 2015-2016 school years (Figure 4.8). 
While this is not a tremendous increase, it is worth noting as a potential consequence of the 
policy changes shifting away from zero tolerance—i.e. it is conceivable that more students 
become diagnosed with a behavioral or learning disability when the culture of their school 
shifts to being more restorative. Inherent in the dualism of zero tolerance is an understanding 
of students as either “good” or “bad” so it may make sense for schools with harsh zero 
tolerance policies to pay less attention to picking up on disabilities with students who are 
misbehaving or not performing optimally, so this increase in IEPs would be interesting to 
further investigate. Furthermore, the data is fairly skewed, with a number of outliers who 
have 100 percent of their student body with IEPs (Figure 4.9). These outliers are most likely 
schools with a special instructional focus on students with disabilities. Some of these schools 
may have more specialized discipline plans, so it may be worth further investigating the other 
aspects of those schools to see if they should be excluded from this particular analysis.  
 
  
Kaul 82 
Figure 4.10 Mean Percentage of Bilingual     Figure 4.11 Histogram of Percentage 
Students over Time  Bilingual Students per School 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondly, there is a parallel increase in the average percentage of bilingual students 
per school of almost two percent (Figure 4.10). This demographic change could either 
indicate that the schools in CPS were failing to provide English education for students with 
limited English proficiency, or that there were new students entering the CPS school district 
during this time with limited English proficiency. Again though, this is a relatively small 
change, so it is a possible that this slight increase is natural, and not due to either of the 
aforementioned causes. It is interesting though, that the highest percentage of schools have a 
mean percentage of bilingual students of 0 percent (Figure 4.10).  Furthermore, the district 
reports that 17.17 percent of their students are considered English Language Learners 
(ELL),43 as of the 2016-2017 school year across grade levels, so the lower percentage of such 
students reported in Figure 4.11 suggests that most of these EL/Bilingual students must be 
concentrated in lower grade-levels (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”). That makes sense, given 
that many of those students must learn English at lower grade levels, prior to high school. 
                                                        
43 The CPS website and data sources seem to use ELL and Bilingual interchangeably, referring to the same 
groups of students.  
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Figure 4.12 Mean Percentage of    Figure 4.13 Histogram of 
Economically Disadvantaged Students over Disadvantaged Students per School   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thirdly, the data on the percentage of economically disadvantaged students per 
school over time also revel some interesting trends. There was a several percentage point 
drop in the 2014-2015 school year before the number went back up in the 2015-2016 school 
year (Figure 4.12). This change likely is just reflective of changes in economic growth in 
CPS during this time period. While this analysis will not integrate any data about the city of 
Chicago itself, rather than just the school district, it may be helpful to compare these changes 
in the percentages of economically disadvantaged students with some proxy of 
socioeconomic status for the city at large.  It is also interesting that the distribution of the 
percentage of economically disadvantaged students over time is most concentrated at and 
around 100 percent (Figure 4.13). This variable, in particular, is revealing about the larger 
overall climate of Chicago, beyond the school district alone, because it captures the changing 
demographics of the students’ families as well as themselves. Because Figure 4.13 is not 
disaggregated by school year, this may be overly concentrating schools around 100 percent, 
when in reality, some schools may fluctuate more than is possible to discern than from either 
of these figures.  
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Figure 4.14 Scatterplot Black and White  Figure 4.15 Scatterplot of Latino and 
White Students in School by Racial Density Students in School by Racial Density 
Index       Index  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Finally, it is helpful to look more closely at the Racial Density index data to learn 
more about the nature of segregation in CPS. While the parabolic nature of this scatterplot 
distribution is not surprising, because it reflects the ways in which the Racial Density index 
was calculated (i.e. using the squared values of non-White racial groups that made up the 
largest portion of CPS high schools), Figures 4.14 and 4.15 are very revealing about the 
nature of racial segregation that CPS experiences. More specifically, as schools become more 
racially segregated in the case of CPS high schools, they become less white. The Racial 
Density index therefore is highly associated with increases in the percentage of students of 
color who compose a school.  The correlational coefficient of Black and Racial Density is 
0.578, which is fairly strongly positive. Strangely though, the correlational coefficient of 
Latino and Density is -0.260, perhaps suggesting that the highly segregated schools 
traditionally have a Black majority in CPS high schools. The interactive effects of Black 
Majority schools with Racial Density will, therefore, be further explored to discern any 
unique effects of highly segregated Black schools on educational outcomes.  
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II. Results   
 The findings involving the misconduct-punishment ratios were the most interesting, 
and informative, in the context of the primary research question of this econometric analysis, 
that is: What are the effects of zero tolerance discipline policies on educational outcomes in 
Chicago public schools? Across all punishment ratios (i.e. the Total Punishment Ratio, 
Suspension Ratio, and Police Notif. Ratio), the ratios of mid-severity misconduct over 
punishment were associated with negative educational outcomes, whereas the ratios of high-
severity misconduct over punishment were associated with positive educational outcomes 
(Table 3; Table 4; Table 5). In other words, when there was a higher ratio of high-severity 
misconduct associated with the punishment a school was employing, those schools had lower 
dropout rates and higher a FOT rate. Whereas, when the ratio of mid-severity misconduct 
increased in relation to the punishment a school was employing, those schools had higher 
dropout rates and a lower FOT rate. For example, for each point increase in the High 
Suspension Ratio (i.e. the ratio of the number Groups 5 and 6 misconduct in a school over 
their total number of suspensions), the dropout rate is expected to be 2.4 percentage points 
lower and the FOT rate is expected to be 8.1 percentage points higher (statistically significant 
at 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively) (Table 4). For the Mid Suspension Ratio, a one-point 
increase in the ratio is associated with a 2 percent decrease in the FOT rate (statistically 
significant at the 10 percent levels) (Table 4). It is worth clarifying what this means more 
specifically, given the difficulty in translating these ratios to real terms. This indicates that 
when there is a higher concentration of the most severe forms of misconduct—such as the 
use of drugs and/or physically attacking another member at school—in relation to the amount 
a school is punishing their students (through suspensions, expulsions, and police 
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notification), then the school is expected to have more positive educational outcomes. On the 
contrary, when a school has a higher concentration of the mid-severity forms of misconduct 
(and the lowest-severity punishment, in the case of the Police Notif. Ratios) in relation to 
punishment, that school is expected to experience more negative educational outcomes 
(Table 3; Table 4; Table 5).44 There were no significant differences found between the 
various punishment ratios (i.e. Total Punishment, Suspensions, and Police Notif.) at this level 
of analysis.  
 While it is not possible to draw any causal stories from the level of analysis 
performed in this study, this does raise some interesting questions in the context of zero 
tolerance policies. It is possible to read the high Low Ratios values for all punishment types 
as a proxy for a school that is particularly harsh, and perhaps adopting zero tolerance 
policies, because they have high levels of punishment associated with lower-level 
misconduct.45 Therefore, the findings that such schools are associated with poorer 
educational outcomes might reveal the beginning of a story about the effect of harsh 
discipline policies on such outcomes. The nuance of this analysis’ story, however, lies in the 
fact that it does not find discipline to be universally associated with negative educational 
outcomes. Rather, when a school experiences a higher density of the most severe cases of 
misconduct, those schools’ punishment ratios are associated with more positive educational 
outcomes. This, at the very least, provides grounds for further investigating the effects of the 
harshness of punishment relative the severity of misconduct on educational outcomes. This is 
                                                        
44 The number of expulsions a school issues is also found to have negative effects on dropout rates, which is not 
all-too-surprising given the association between the two variables. It was not possible to discern in the CPS data 
sets if expulsions were included in the dropout rates, so this finding is not necessarily anything more than 
collinearity. 
45 This ratio is, of course, a rough proxy for what it is attempting to capture, because the punishment included in 
this ratio is not necessarily all in response to the misconduct being accounted for. 
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essentially the question of the effectiveness of zero tolerance policies, and this analysis 
provides some fascinating leads to begin answering this question. 
 In addition to the effects of discipline patterns on educational outcomes, this 
analysis’s findings related to the other school-level factors supports the cited existing 
literature in the context of CPS. One surprising finding that strays from existing literature is 
that, across all of the regression models, Black Majority schools were strongly associated 
with more positive FOT rates. More specifically, all regressions found that schools with a 
Black Majority were associated with an increase in FOT of at least 14 percent, significant at 
1 percent (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5). While at first glance, this finding may seem to directly 
contradict the existing literature that suggests that Black students typically experience poorer 
educational outcomes than their peers, this finding is necessary to contextualize in the 
particular composition of CPS. While Latino variables were not included in the full 
regressions in an effort to control for collinearity with Bilingual, a school with marginally 
more Latino and being a Latino Majority was negatively associated with educational 
outcomes (Table 2).46 The Black Majority measure is designed to capture which racial group 
makes is most prevalent in a school, but this is possible through a plurality (i.e. less than 50 
percent). In a school district whose largest racial group is Black students (compromising 37.7 
percent of the district), this plurality is not as instructive as it might be as school-level data 
(CPS “Stats and Facts”). However, when one considers the interactive effects of the Racial 
Density measure and Black Majority, the findings are much more aligned with existing 
literature. This interaction term is highest when Black students both compose the largest 
racial group in a school, and that school is also highly segregated. For this variable, all 
                                                        
46These findings are not explored at length because they are only included in the partial regressions. The Latino 
variable and its interactions were not significant, economically or statistically, in any of the full models. 
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models found there to be incredibly large, negative effects of a school having a Black 
Majority and a higher Racial Density value: each model found such schools to be associated 
with at least a 31 percent lower FOT rate, significant at 1 percent (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5). 
This suggests that, for a school district with as many students of color as CPS, racial 
composition alone is insufficient in capturing the full dynamics of race at the school-level; 
instead, racial segregation provides the fuller picture.  
 In terms of the demographic controls in question—IEP, Economically 
Disadvantaged, and Bilingual —almost all of the findings in this analysis support the 
predictions that were made based on the existing literature that all of these controls would 
negatively impact educational outcomes. More specifically, across all statistically significant 
findings, an increase in the percentage of students with an IEP in a school was associated 
with an increase in dropout rates and a decrease in the FOT. The most significant of such 
findings were in the disaggregated lagged Police Notif. Ratio regressions (Regression 8), 
which found that a one percent increase in the amount of students with an IEP was associated 
with a .216 percent increase in the dropout rate and a .827 percent decrease in the FOT rate 
(Table 5). Though these changes are not hugely economically significant, it does make sense 
that a 1 percent change in any given demographic would not change the entire culture of a 
school. Though some of the findings for IEP*Percentage Black were statistically significant, 
their economic significance was so small that it seems this model was unable to pick up on 
the strength of the interactive effects of being both Black and having an IEP that the literature 
was able to pick up on (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5).  
While there were findings for EconDisad, they were not as large as expected and they 
were not statistically significant across the regressions. Most of these findings concluded 
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there to be a negative relationship between EconDisad and FOT—i.e. the higher the 
percentage of students who were economically disadvantaged in a school, the lower the 
expected FOT; however, two of the regressions also found there to be a negative relationship 
between dropout rates and FOT (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5). For example, in the Total 
Punishment Ratio regression 5 (with the disaggregated punishment ratios and all controls), a 
one percent increase in the amount of economically disadvantaged students in a school was 
associated with a 0.04 percent decrease in dropout rates (significant at 10 percent) (Table 3). 
Given the extremely marginal nature of this economic significance, this finding likely just 
indicates that the model was not picking up on any significant effects of EconDisad on 
educational outcomes. Perhaps one reason for this was because 80.22 percent of the district is 
classified as “economically disadvantaged,” so this measure was not precise enough to 
capture strong effects in a one percent change in the concentration of economically 
disadvantages students in any given school (CPS “CPS Stats and Facts”). Perhaps an SES 
segregation index, or a dummy to designate schools with very high and very low levels of 
economically disadvantaged students (i.e. 95 percent and above, and 5 percent and below, 
respectively), would have captured more significant effects along socioeconomic lines.   
 The findings for Bilingual, however, were more significant, perhaps in part because 
of the decision to exclude Hispanic from the regressions to control for the collinearity 
between the two variables. In any case, all statistically significant findings demonstrated that 
schools with higher percentages of students classified as Bilingual (i.e. EL learners), the 
higher the associated dropout rates and the lower the associated FOT rate (Table 3; Table 4; 
Table 5). This is consistent with existing literature’s findings, except for the fact that this 
analysis was unable to disentangle the effects of being an EL based on one’s migration status. 
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Given the literature’s suggestion that the number of generations one is removed from 
migration affects one’s educational outcomes to be either positive or negative, this would be 
an important distinction to make, given access to better data.  
 Finally, across the regressions, the Time Trend variable indicates that educational 
outcomes marginally improved over time. For example, for the first regression in the Total 
Punishment Ration regression, each year increase (between 2011 and 2016) was associated 
with a -.278 percent change in the dropout rate (significant at 10 percent) (Table 3). Given 
the focus on the three policy changes CPS made in order to reduce zero tolerance 
disciplining, it is possible that the time trend might indicate the effectiveness of this policy 
change by the improvement in dropout rates over time. However, given that the Time Trend 
variable may also have been picking up on any other number of trends over time in CPS (not 
being already controlled for with the fixed-effects), it is hard to parse out the specific policy 
effects from these observations. In order to better understand the policy effects of the three 
aforementioned CPS policy changes, therefore, it would be best to test the treatment effects 
through a differences-in-differences approach. This was not possible within this present 
analysis because there were not distinct “treatment” and “non-treatment” groups because all 
schools were affected by certain district-wide policy changes, such as the changes made to 
the Student Code of Conduct.   
 
III. Caveats to Analysis   
 
 Before it is possible to draw national conclusions from this case study of discipline 
policy in CPS, it is necessary to point out several caveats about the data set that have 
implications for the findings. The most significant thing to note is that this analysis is only 
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capable of really picking up on school-based effects, rather than student-level effects. In 
other words, this analysis looks at the impact of changes in discipline on overall school 
climate and the impact of that all on school-level educational outcomes. However, given the 
number of other indicators that may affect school climate, apart from the controls this study 
was able to take account of, this is a somewhat haphazard approach. The more ideal data set 
would therefore be student-level panel data that tracks students over some set of years, and 
even between schools.  This is because there are grounds to believe that much of the data 
analyzed in the context of this study did not contain a constant group of students. A 2009 
report published by the Consortium on Chicago School Research (CCSR) has found that 
student mobility in CPS has decreased since 1995 and the mobility rates are typically lower 
among high school students than elementary school students (de la Torre and Gwynne 3). 
However, mobility between schools is still a relevant concern, in particular because the 
CCSR findings indicate that, at the high school-level, Black students are disproportionately 
mobile, when compared to their peers (4). Because the sort of students that compose CPS, 
and particularly black males—are typically the focus of the literature on zero tolerance, these 
changes in the demographics of each school are not negligible. If the primary students 
affected by school discipline policies are moving from schools before the treatment effects of 
policy changes can be measured, then the “educational outcomes” this study captures will not 
even be those of the students in question. This complicates the notion of finding school-level 
effects because it is questionable if it is changes in “school climate” that are truly being 
captured over time if the composition of the school is dramatically changing.  Furthermore, 
there is also a great level of inconsistency in terms of which schools are open in CPS: “Since 
1994, 143 schools have opened and 60 have closed” (Sebring et al. 5).  This problem is 
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manifested in the fact that there is not a completely consistent sample of schools across the 
years of data used for this study. The rapid closure and opening of schools also compounds 
the likelihood of students being mobile between schools. All of this is to say that these 
findings must be taken with a grain of salt and that further studies should seek to use panel 
data, when available. The challenge is, of course, the privacy concerns in having publicly 
accessible, detailed panel data for minors (especially when it comes to discipline and crime-
related data), so any such study might also have to involve original data collection.  
 A second problem with this analysis lies in the fallibility of data associated with the 
reported number and the severity of “misconduct.”  As it became very apparent in working 
through the CPS Student Code of Conduct’s definition for different “Groups” of misconduct, 
there is a great level of subjectivity in terms of what is considered any given level of 
misconduct. And, within a context in which certain types of students are arguably racially 
coded as part of the “disorder” of schools, it is not difficult to imagine the ways such students 
may be misattributed as being guilty, particularly when they are in group settings where it is 
more difficult for teachers or administrators to efficiently discern who is responsible in that 
context. In a longitudinal study of an urban high school in the Midwest that employed 
classroom observations, videotaped lessons, and interviews, Vavrus and Cole found that 
“suspensions frequently occur in the absence of any physical violence or blatant verbal 
abuse. Rather suspensions are often preceded by a complex series of nonviolent events when 
one disruptive act among many is singled out for action by the teacher” (87). In other words, 
Vavrus and Cole found that situations where there might be “disorder” in the classroom, but 
no “obvious breach of disciplinary policy,” can result in suspensions when the teacher singles 
out certain students as being responsible for that disorder (who may or may not have been 
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directly implicated in said behavior) (88). The students who are singled out in this way are 
most often female, and either Black or Latina, which supports the notion that these trends 
might be racially coded in some ways (88). There is a lot more that could be looked in here 
regarding the role of zero tolerance within this sort of misconduct “grey area”; however, the 
purpose of introducing this literature to this analysis is to just highlight the extent to which \ 
misconduct gets marked as being more or less severe has the room to be inconsistent by 
teacher and/or school. The punishment ratios employed in this analysis are the best proxy, 
given the available data, for school harshness and zero tolerance.  
 A third limitation of this analysis is that it is entirely a top-down analysis, so it misses 
the knowledge that can be gained from individual student experiences. The seriousness of 
this limitation became apparent to me when I was discussing my thesis with a classmate who 
grew up attending schools in the CPS district. I mentioned my research to her, with a clear 
bent against zero tolerance and support for restorative justice models. She recounted that her 
younger brother had been badly beaten up at school after the very anti-zero tolerance reforms 
this analysis looks at were implemented, and the person who beat him up was only given a 
two-day suspension. She suggested that this level of punishment in that context was basically 
meaningless, and demeaned the seriousness of the violent act against her brother. When I 
asked her about other students’ and the broader community’s perceptions of restorative 
justice peace circles and other such measures, she suggested that students consider them 
more or less a “joke” and, therefore, do not treat them with the seriousness that much of the 
literature in support of them says they are. This insight is just one personal narrative from a 
student for whom CPS’ discipline policy was a daily, lived reality, and it challenged the 
understanding of zero tolerance that this analysis has come to. It is hard to know how this 
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analysis would further shift if additional individual narratives were centered throughout. As 
someone with no personal experience within CPS, within public schools, or within larger 
urban schools, there are serious limitations that my personal experiences present. As much as 
I can attempt to deconstruct the various narratives about CPS that emerge in the literature and 
in common language, those deconstructions can only go so far. My own positionality is 
therefore inextricably tied to the way I have processed this research. This is all to say that any 
cohesive analysis of CPS discipline policy, or zero tolerance in general, must center student 
voices, community voices, administrator voices, parent voices, etc. This analysis provides a 
remotely detached view of such policies, which is helpful as far as big-picture analyses go. 
However, if one were to develop this analysis further, integrating interviews and community 
feedback in some more intentional way would improve both the integrity of this project and 
its ability to serve the communities it is about.47   
 
IV. Possible Improvement to the Model  
 While this analysis did reveal some critical findings about the nature of discipline and 
school demographics on educational outcomes, there are ways in which the econometric 
model itself has room to grow. For one, it would be useful to use the data set to estimate a 
line of best fit using the multiple years worth of panel data, and then compare the predicted 
values with the actual values to predict the level of punishment one would expect given a 
certain degree of misconduct. The differences between the actual and predicted values here 
                                                        
47 One such work is Victor Rios’s book Punished—a work that he composed after following the lives of 
approximately forty Black and Latino boys in Oakland for three years. The differences between that book and 
this present analysis are grounded in their differing research methodologies—this analysis focuses more on the 
analysis of quantities data and academic publications, whereas his work is grounded in personal narrative. Much 
of the differences therefore ultimately come down to the particular training of the author, which is just to say 
that reading this analysis alongside work like Rios’ book is critical to getting a more complete understanding of 
school discipline policies and the school-to-prison pipeline.     
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could provide an even stronger proxy for a sort of irregular level of “harshness” in the 
discipline policies of a school because those residuals would be a rough measure of any 
deviation from traditional punishment over time.  
 A second improvement to the existing analysis would be to specify and/or 
sophisticate the current variables more. The current regression models have R-squared values 
no higher than 0.32, suggesting the majority of the determinants of the model are not being 
controlled for yet. For example, the existing literature suggests that there are a number of 
interaction effects that are not captured in these models, such as those between SES and 
Race, Language Status and Migration Status, Language Status and Race, Racial Segregation 
and Language, etc. Part of the reason all of these interaction terms were not simply generated 
using the existing variables was because of the nature of the data being school-level. With 
student-level data, creating interaction terms between those variables would actually create 
an interaction that finds the effects of having that particular intersectional identity; however, 
with school-level data, that interaction term is a haphazard approximation for the size of the 
student population with the two given identities and is, therefore, much less precise and much 
less useful. Another way of better specifying the data would be to come up with better 
proxies of segregation for variables other than the race-based ones. For example, one could 
create a dummy variable to designate schools with very high percentages of economically 
disadvantaged students, bilingual students, students with an IEP, etc. and use those as the 
tested variables, rather than simply plugging in the variables straight from the data set, in the 
regressions. This might provide stronger findings—particularly given the nature of CPS 
being composed of 80.22 percent economically disadvantaged students, 17.17 percent ELs, 
and 13.66 percent students with IEPs (CPS “Stats and Facts”). In other words, the marginal 
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effects of a high school having one more percentage points of economically disadvantaged 
students might be fairly negligible, whereas the effects of a school having at least 95 percent 
of their students economically disadvantaged might be more significant.  
 And finally, this analysis could have done a more serious job to control for 
collinearity. While the decision was made to remove Latino variables from the data set 
because of their correlation to Bilingual, there were a number of other variables that were 
correlated (albeit, to a lesser degree) that likely caused a certain degree of collinearity in the 
model. For example, Black and Econ Disad have a correlational coefficient of 0.23, Econ 
Disad and IEP has a correlational coefficient of 0.412, and—more concerning—the 
disaggregated punishment ratios also were positively correlated to similar, or greater,48 
degrees. This is all to say that, given more time to work to work with the data, a less collinear 
and more well-developed proxy for “zero tolerance”/”harshness” needs to be developed. 
There is a challenge inherent to dealing with collinearity with this sort of data, given the 
strong connections between race variables with others like SES, punishment trends, etc., so 
interaction terms might be one way to accommodate to these dynamics. So much of the 
literature on school discipline provides reason to believe that all of the same determinants 
identified in this study for educational outcomes are also determinants of punishment itself.49 
Because punishment was treated as another independent variable in this study, this posses 
immediate concerns for collinearity.  
  
 
                                                        
48 One particularly concerning finding was that the disaggregated Suspension Ratios had correlational 
coefficients all 0.94 or greater with one and other.  
49 For example, according to the literature review I completed for my Applied Econometrics final paper, I found 
that existing literature suggests there to be some relationship between school discipline and race, gender, 
disability status, EL status, high-stakes testing schedules (which was identified as a confounding variable in this 
analysis), and school quality measures.  
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Chapter 5  
Policy Recommendations  
 
 
 Given these findings regarding the effects of zero tolerance school discipline policies 
on educational outcomes in the context of Chicago Public Schools, there are larger lessons 
that can be drawn about the role of zero tolerance policies at the national level. 
Because “zero tolerance” has come to mean different things across states, school districts, 
and even schools, surveying the levels of possible change will help provide a useful 
background on how to target school discipline change at various levels of policy. This 
chapter will begin by drawing on the conclusions from the case study of Chicago Public 
Schools to the national context and will then survey the possible levels of change in the 
system of school discipline, before making general policy recommendations.  
 
A. Conclusions and Lessons for Nation at Large 
 
  It would be haphazard—at this level of analysis—to make sweeping conclusions for 
discipline policies nationally based on the results from the case study on Chicago Public 
Schools alone; however, there are a few interesting findings that might inform future research 
about the application of these findings to a national context. For one, this study indicates that 
race matters to educational outcomes; however, the effects of race are largely moderated by 
racial segregation. Segregation seems to have a sort of multiplier effect in that, when many 
students from disadvantaged groups (either racially, or possible also socioeconomically, in 
terms of their language status, etc.) are concentrated within a school, then the other stressors 
that negatively effect educational outcomes become more pronounced. For example, high-
stakes testing is critically important for school funding, especially for public schools with 
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high concentrations of working class students. Such schools are also likely to have larger 
communities of color, immigrant students, EL students, etc. because of the strong 
relationship between these variables. Chicago is a typical case of the sort of district most 
directly affected by zero tolerance policies: as a large urban school district with high 
concentrations of students of color who come from working class families and a rate of 
school closures, schools in Chicago are under a large deal of stress to ensure their own 
positive educational outcomes. Such conditions place teachers and administrators in a unique 
position where policing to ensure “order” at their school is sometimes viewed as a necessary 
step in order to make sure that they keep their schools, and community, afloat. Therefore, this 
analysis is not intended to assign guilt onto those who run highly-segregated schools like 
many of those in Chicago, but instead it seeks to push for more critical conversation about 
the larger systems at play that lead to teachers and administrators in schools across the 
country resorting to zero tolerance policies in the first place. Given the findings in this 
analysis that the relative harshness of discipline matters to the educational outcomes of a 
school, these findings about segregation and discipline carry particular importance, even 
outside of Chicago’s context. Also given that Arne Duncan went on to lead the US 
Department of Education on the platform of scaling the same sort of test-based accountability 
systems and harsher discipline he developed in Chicago to the national context, this case 
study of CPS schools is particularly critical in thinking about the dynamics of testing, 
funding, and discipline across the nation. This is not to say the conditions of CPS are exactly 
the same as those at all other schools in the nation, but rather that the case study of CPS 
validates existing findings regarding the dangers of zero tolerance, particularly in the current 
system of test-based accountability and funding.  
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B. Surveying Levels of Change 
 
Federal-Level Policy Change: Focusing in on GFSA and Due Process  
 
Given the lack of a cohesive national policy that defines the practice of zero tolerance  
across all US schools, there are a number of levels at which discipline policy changes might 
be addressed. The first possibility of change at the federal level would be to repeal or amend 
the existing federal Gun-Free Schools Act in response to its very loose definition of what a 
“dangerous weapon” is. This could take the form of repealing the GFSA and introducing an 
entirely new bill with clearer due process protections for all students, introducing amendment 
to the existing law to narrow the definition of “dangerous weapons,” or implementing a more 
secure enforcement mechanism to ensure that schools are actually being held responsible for 
their protection (or lack thereof) of students’ due process rights. Alternatively at the federal 
level, the Supreme Court could rule against the constitutionality of the GFSA because of its 
systematic neglect of the due process protections required under the 14th Amendment. Given 
the current political climate with the Republican control of Washington and the conservative 
majority on the Supreme Court, this level of change is likely to be politically unfeasible, at 
least for the next four years, if not much longer. This level of change also would not 
necessarily cause the dynamics of moral panic around “deviancy” and “disorder” in schools 
to be eliminated in any ways; it seems more likely that this level of policy change would 
happen only once those broader shifts in the culture around juvenile crime and school 
discipline occur within American society. Without these shifts, then there is always a risk 
that the systems in place governing school discipline will fail to actually ensure due process 
protections for all students. Therefore, it is critical to consider other, more bottom-up 
methods for catalyzing change in the space of school discipline.  
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State-Level Politics: Minimizing Sentencing Rules  
 
The next possible level of change would be state-level reform. This is the status quo 
condition means of responding to zero tolerance policies; however, there is no uniform way 
in which states respond to zero tolerance. For example, Illinois has attempted to tackle zero 
tolerance by setting standards for discipline data:  
Illinois passed legislation in 2014 that requires all publicly-funded schools to report 
data on the issuance of out-of-school suspensions, expulsions, and removals to 
alternative settings in lieu of another disciplinary action. (Advocacy & 
Communication Solutions)50  
 
The Michigan State Board of Education adopted the “Model Code of Student Conduct 2014,” 
which strongly urged school districts against the use of zero tolerance disciple and 
“articulat[ed] the importance of integrating proactive steps of evidence-based, pro-social 
development practices into the school culture and sustaining them as vital elements of school 
operations” (8). Other states, such as Oklahoma, have shifted their focus to increased “mental 
health counseling and social services” (8). Another alternative policy route that is being 
employed by some states is utilizing positive reinforcement mechanisms (rather than negative 
ones) to motivate positive behavior by students. For example, Louisiana has passed state 
legislation “requiring that the school master plans in various localities prepare and include 
provisions for staff and administrator training on positive school behavioral supports and 
practices” (8). According to existing literature’s findings on the effects of such “School-Wide 
Behavioral Interventions,” such positive-reinforcement methods are associated with 
“improved academic performance, better social behavior, and reductions in referrals to the 
principal’s office for discipline polices” at the elementary school-level (Boccanfuso and 
Kuhfeld 8). Therefore, there are a number of approaches for state governments to take in 
                                                        
50 This is the same sort of data that was employed for this analysis.  
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dealing with school discipline—including new legislation, increased funding for social 
services and positive behavioral interventions (perhaps in collaboration with non-profit 
organizations), and more. There are a multitude possibilities at this level of governance to 
make wide-sweeping changes in the dynamics of school discipline, so each state seeking to 
make such changes should tailor whatever policy changes they pursue to the particular 
circumstances within their state. Given the potentially significant variance between districts, 
even within the same state, it may be preferable to pursue district-level changes for some of 
these policy changes.   
 
District and School-Level Changes  
Another possible level of change would be at the school district or school level, as 
can be seen in the case of CPS’ reforms. In terms of district change, policies could introduce 
and enforce some regularized means of ensuring due process protections for students, or even 
just work to eliminate the heavy presence of police on elementary and high school campuses. 
When one considers the role of zero tolerance in normalizing the school-to-prison pipeline, 
the presence of police surveillance within schools—labeling a food fight as a misdemeanor—
cannot be overstated. Accordingly, one of the most popular alternatives to zero tolerance is 
the introduction of restorative justice models, either by the school district, or through private 
organizations or non-profits. These programs target the underlying sources of conflict that 
are responsible for school misconduct and have been found to be critical in improving school 
safety and educational outcomes for schools that have adopted the model. If these programs 
are successful at this level of change, it is possible to work them up through the system to the 
state and federal levels. 
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For example, there is research that suggests that the restorative justice (RJ) model is 
better equipped to address the underlying dynamics of power that might be responsible for 
students acting out in school in the first place:  
Tyler (2006) argues that by giving people, particularly students, a voice in the 
decision-making and procedural justice process, they will view institutional power as 
more legitimate and fair. Tyler also makes the case that empowering youth may lead 
to better self-regulation without the need for formal discipline. Zehr (2002) and other 
argue that RJ results in a shift in how discipline is applied, which increases student 
perception about fairness of educator actions, thereby leading to a greater compliance 
as they see the school order as having legitimacy. (Fronius et al.5)  
 
This literature all captures the role of perceived legitimacy from the perspective of the 
individual committing the “crime” because the model depends on the understanding that “the 
key to motivating compliance based on internal social values is to maintain the legitimacy of 
the law and of legal authorities” (Tyler 317). The restorative justice model is therefore 
responsive to concerns that harsher, zero tolerance approaches are unjust in their unequal 
application of punishment to students of color, students with disabilities, etc. Such practices 
often diminish the trust the most vulnerable students have for authority and can make them 
feel even more excluded from the traditional “social order” of their schools. Inherent in the 
dualist zero tolerance framework is an understanding of Us vs. Them—those whose behavior 
is socially acceptable, and those whose behavior is “deviant.” With more rigid systems of 
punishment that frame students who commit such behavioral infractions as inherently 
“violent,” “deviant,” or “at risk,” there is a strong potential to reinforce the original social 
controls that may have cause the students to act out in the first place. There are a multitude of 
schools and districts employing effective models of restorative justice that might be worth 
investigating more closely, should a district be seeking to tailor a model of restorative justice 
to their own community. Many of these programs involve things like peer juries, which allow 
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students to have a voice in discipline proceedings and to see themselves as a critical member 
of their community. The power of models like the peer jury is that they reverse many of the 
hierarchies that emerge within schools that have a harsh focus on “discipline” as a part of 
their school culture.  
 
C. Policy Recommendations  
 Given these various policy options, it is hard to suggest that there is any singular  
combination of changes that would be the most effective. What is more of a factor in the case 
of making changes in the US education system is the presence of political coalitions willing 
and able to fight for those changes. Also given the particular political order at the moment in 
the US with the Republican majority at multiple levels of politics, it seems like the methods 
of change that would be most likely to work are more grass-roots, or district-level changes, 
rather than federal policy change. In particular, an overhaul of federal school policies or the 
GFSA on the grounds of civil rights and due process protections seems particularly unlikely, 
given Jeff Sessions’ position as Attorney General and Besty DeVos’ as the Secretary of 
Education. The system of “school choice” is one that heavily incentivizes the same test-based 
accountability systems that have contributed to the rise of zero tolerance policies in the first 
place.  
 There are a number of examples of approaches to shifting away from zero tolerance 
that have been suggested in the preceding section, any of which could serve as models for 
future change. The main recommendation that I would make to any policymakers engaged 
with work in school discipline is that it is necessary to be aware of the multiplier effects of 
segregation on other determinants of educational outcomes. Discipline policies do not exist 
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within a vacuum, but are rather in constant conversation with other systemic forces at play—
including, but not limited to racial, socioeconomic, and linguistic segregation. Making real 
changes in the current systems of zero tolerance policies will therefore require the same sort 
of multi-disciplinary approach employed in this analysis. That is, understanding the ways in 
which zero tolerance is deeply rooted in dualistic, media-driven representations of youth, for 
example, reveals that any successful alternative to zero tolerance must be doing work to 
deconstruct such representations. Given the complexity of the historical, political, and 
ideological forces at play when it comes to zero tolerance policies, it is therefore necessary to 
engage in whatever positive changes to discipline are possible within those present contexts.  
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Concluding Thoughts  
 
 The story of zero tolerance policies in US schools reveals a profound deal about the 
dynamics of the American education system in the past several decades; however, it also 
provides significant insight into bigger questions on how certain communities become 
defined, by their very nature of existence, as somehow “deviant” from “traditional” social 
order. Implicit in harsh discipline models that treat different groups disproportionately is a 
value judgment about which types of people and which behaviors are considered to be 
“productive,” “moral,” or otherwise conforming to the dominant social order of American 
society. Therefore, the ways in which particular identities become policed at the level of 
schools has tremendous implications on American political order as a whole. David Labaree 
aptly reflects, “Schools, it seems, occupy an awkward position at the intersection between 
what we hope society will become and what we think it really is, between political ideals and 
economic realities” (41). Schools serve as both the origin and sites of reproduction for many 
of the inequalities one can observe more broadly within American society, so the necessity to 
critically engage with what is happening within our schools today cannot be overstated. 
Ultimately, the public narrative over who is a “good” or “hardworking” student is moderated 
by the discourse around discipline. The increasingly dualistic representations of children in 
the context of US schools reflects a pervasive fixed mindset about the possibilities of 
learning and behavior by students, but also of entire marginalized communities. These same 
notions of “deviancy” and “disorder” seep into other aspects of the American consciousness, 
subliminally affecting how the political order comes to define itself.  
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Tables  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics by School Year (2011-2016)  
 
       Obs.  Mean S.D. Min Max 
2011-2012 
Educational Outcomes:  
     Freshman On-track Rate 
     Dropout Rate  
 
Race (by %):  
    White  
    Black  
    Latino   
   
Racial Density Index  
 
Demographic Controls (by %):  
    Bilingual 
    IEP 
    Economically Disadvantaged  
 
% Misconduct Resulting in a…  
    ISS 
    OSS 
    Police Notification  
  
Number of Students Expelled 
 
Number of Misconduct by Level: 
Low Level 
Mid Level 
High Level 
 
Total Punishment Ratio 
Low Punishment Ratio 
Mid Punishment Ratio 
High Punishment Ratio 
 
Suspension Ratio 
Low Suspension Ratio 
Mid Suspension Ratio 
High Suspension Ratio  
 
Police Notif. Ratio 
Low Police Ratio 
 
85 
87 
 
 
87 
87 
87 
 
87 
 
 
87 
87 
87 
 
 
87 
87 
87 
 
87 
 
 
87 
87 
87 
 
87 
87 
87 
87 
 
87 
87 
87 
87 
 
80 
80 
 
78.614 
4.884 
 
 
6.123 
51.710 
37.613 
 
0.678 
 
 
5.128 
14.876 
89.610 
 
 
29.2 
43.339 
6.355 
 
1.241 
 
 
491.920 
346.195 
56.644 
 
1.610 
0.839 
0.631 
0.140 
 
1.809 
0.931 
0.715 
0.162 
 
101.638 
64.875 
 
16.007 
5.732 
 
 
6.123 
51.710 
37.613 
 
0.276 
 
 
6.121 
5.983 
14.421 
 
 
25.733 
27.089 
10.518 
 
2.449 
 
 
727.970 
524.727 
51.418 
 
1.202 
0.965 
0.432 
0.105 
 
1.600 
1.597 
1.158 
0.137 
 
204.353 
156.657 
 
0 
.1 
 
 
10.620 
38.883 
34.297 
 
0.114 
 
 
0 
4.05 
34.35 
 
 
0 
4.8 
0 
 
0 
 
 
1 
3 
1 
 
0.603 
0.020 
0.150 
.007 
 
0.832 
0.031 
0.151 
0.007 
 
1.657 
0.179 
 
98.6 
32.8 
 
 
48.9 
99.8 
98.5 
 
0.996 
 
 
26 
29.74 
100 
 
 
87.9 
98.1 
60.4 
 
12 
 
 
4416 
3753 
225 
 
7.950 
6.766 
2.833 
0.515 
 
12.286 
7.230 
4.857 
0.6 
 
1175.5 
990.5 
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Mid Police Ratio  
High Police Ratio  
 
80 
80 
30.716 
6.046 
46.911 
11.081 
0.714 
0.118 
229.5 
72.5 
 
2012-2013 
Educational Outcomes:  
     Freshman On-track Rate 
     Dropout Rate  
 
Race (by %):  
    White  
    Black  
    Latino   
   
Racial Density Index  
 
Demographic Controls (by %):  
    Bilingual 
    IEP 
    Economically Disadvantaged  
 
% Misconduct Resulting in a…  
    ISS 
    OSS 
    Police Notification  
 
Number of Students Expelled 
 
Number of Misconduct by Level: 
Low Level 
Mid Level 
High Level 
 
Total Punishment Ratio 
Low Punishment Ratio 
Mid Punishment Ratio 
High Punishment Ratio 
 
Suspension Ratio 
Low Suspension Ratio 
Mid Suspension Ratio 
High Suspension Ratio  
 
Police Notif. Ratio 
Low Police Ratio 
Mid Police Ratio  
High Police Ratio  
 
82 
85 
 
 
86 
86 
86 
 
86 
 
 
86 
86 
86 
 
 
86 
86 
86 
 
86 
 
 
86 
86 
86 
 
86 
86 
86 
86 
 
86 
86 
86 
86 
 
80 
80 
80 
8 
 
79.552 
4.64 
 
 
6.349 
51.457 
37.570 
 
0.676 
 
 
5.019 
14.844 
89.503 
 
 
31.272 
42.353 
7.472 
 
1.116 
 
 
424.767 
358.105 
56.291 
 
1.523 
0.759 
0.619 
0.145 
 
1.703 
0.833 
0.698 
0.172 
 
100.994 
55.847 
39.481 
5.666 
 
14.657 
4.924  
 
 
10.859 
39.112 
34.175 
 
0.275 
 
 
6.071 
6.010 
14.470 
 
 
24.910 
26.332 
11.265 
 
1.818 
 
 
467.309 
402.365 
53.515 
 
1.090 
0.814 
0.407 
0.132 
 
1.207 
0.872 
0.481 
0.173 
 
213.408 
144.501 
85.613 
14.281 
 
7.3 
0 
 
 
0 
1 
0 
 
0.107 
 
 
0 
4.05 
34.35 
 
 
0 
1.5 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0.667 
0 
0 
0 
 
0.940 
0 
0 
0 
 
2 
0 
0 
0 
 
99.3 
23.7 
 
 
48.2 
99.5 
97.1 
 
0.990 
 
 
26 
29.74 
100 
 
 
78 
100 
50 
 
7 
 
 
1959 
2266 
270 
 
7.408 
5.469 
2.167 
0.667 
 
7.615 
5.469 
2.753 
1 
 
1305 
970 
533 
92 
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2013-2014 
 Educational Outcomes:  
     Freshman On-track Rate 
     Dropout Rate  
 
Race (by %):  
    White  
    Black  
    Latino   
   
Racial Density Index  
 
Demographic Controls (by %):  
    Bilingual 
    IEP 
    Economically Disadvantaged  
 
% Misconduct Resulting in a…  
    ISS 
    OSS 
    Police Notification  
 
Number of Students Expelled 
 
Number of Misconduct by Level: 
Low Level 
Mid Level 
High Level 
 
Total Punishment Ratio 
Low Punishment Ratio 
Mid Punishment Ratio 
High Punishment Ratio 
 
Suspension Ratio 
Low Suspension Ratio 
Mid Suspension Ratio 
High Suspension Ratio  
 
Police Notif. Ratio 
Low Police Ratio  
Mid Police Ratio  
High Police Ratio  
 
 
85 
87 
 
 
87 
87 
87 
 
87 
 
 
87 
87 
87 
 
 
87 
87 
87 
 
87 
 
 
87 
87 
87 
 
87 
87 
87 
87 
 
87 
87 
87 
87 
 
79 
79 
79 
79 
 
81.005 
4.662 
 
 
6.270 
51.071 
38.039 
 
0.671 
 
 
5.334 
15.193 
88.606 
 
 
30.157 
43.294 
5.120 
 
0.966 
 
 
489.460 
302.828 
57.425 
 
1.585 
0.811 
0.627 
0.147 
 
1.733 
0.879 
0.691 
0.164 
 
85.339 
50.693 
28.177 
6.470 
 
13.248 
5.032 
 
 
10.751 
38.785 
33.938 
 
0.272 
 
 
6.435 
6.117 
14.685 
 
 
26.345 
25.412 
8.065 
 
1.9979 
 
 
655.131 
296.812 
52.544 
 
1.109 
0.856 
0.394 
0.120 
 
1.265 
0.955 
0.470 
0.138 
 
113.773 
77.334 
38.065 
10.167 
 
46 
0 
 
 
10.752 
38.785 
33.939 
 
0.272 
 
 
6.435 
6.117 
14.685 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0.709 
0 
0 
0 
 
0.748 
0 
0 
0 
 
1.639 
0 
0.893 
0.378 
 
 
100 
24 
 
 
24 
48 
98.4 
 
1 
 
 
27.34 
34.2 
100 
 
 
100 
98.5 
61 
 
11 
 
 
3305 
1223 
240 
 
7.103 
5.955 
2.162 
0.526 
 
7.914 
6.638 
2.718 
0.6 
 
553 
298 
196 
70 
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2014-2015 
Educational Outcomes:  
     Freshman On-track Rate 
     Dropout Rate  
 
Race (by %):  
    White  
    Black  
    Latino   
   
Racial Density Index  
 
Demographic Controls (by %):  
    Bilingual 
    IEP 
    Economically Disadvantaged  
 
% Misconduct Resulting in a…  
    ISS 
    OSS 
    Police Notification  
 
Number of Students Expelled 
 
Number of Misconduct by Level: 
Low Level 
Mid Level 
High Level 
 
Total Punishment Ratio 
Low Punishment Ratio 
Mid Punishment Ratio 
High Punishment Ratio 
 
Suspension Ratio 
Low Suspension Ratio 
Mid Suspension Ratio 
High Suspension Ratio  
 
Police Notif. Ratio 
Low Police Ratio  
Mid Police Ratio  
High Police Ratio  
 
 
 
91 
91 
 
 
94 
94 
94 
 
94 
 
 
94 
94 
94 
 
 
94 
94 
94 
 
94 
 
 
94 
94 
94 
 
94 
94 
94 
94 
 
94 
94 
94 
94 
 
89 
89 
89 
89 
 
 
 
 
81.008 
4.543 
 
 
6.643 
49.548 
38.986 
 
0.654 
 
 
5.907 
15.227 
85.671 
 
 
28.536 
43.530 
6.599 
 
1.127 
 
 
680.596 
339.957 
60.202 
 
1.728 
0.976 
0.611 
0.140 
 
1.883 
1.053 
0.674 
0.156 
 
122.287 
88.413 
28.092 
5.782 
 
13.160 
4.969 
 
 
11.056 
38.085 
33.231 
 
0.269 
 
 
7.003 
6.807 
16.140 
 
 
25.562 
27.649 
8.850 
 
2.241 
 
 
1053.897 
392.683 
58.330 
 
1.623 
1.389 
0.423 
0.117 
 
1.840 
1.534 
0.503 
0.135 
 
380.900 
365.257 
51.102 
9.380 
 
43.9 
0.2 
 
 
0 
1.1 
0 
 
0.096 
 
 
0 
2.685 
30.891 
 
 
0 
0.5 
0 
 
0 
 
 
1 
6 
0 
 
0.707 
0.018 
0.012 
0 
 
0.833 
0.021 
0.013 
0 
 
2.711 
0.1 
0.994 
0 
 
100 
25.4 
 
 
48.2 
99.7 
98.9 
 
0.994 
 
 
24.818 
30.605 
99.462 
 
 
97.5 
100 
36.9 
 
11 
 
 
5667 
2254 
390 
 
12.729 
10.486 
2.941 
0.605 
 
14.237 
11.728 
3.846 
0.667 
 
3430 
3378 
350 
50.5 
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2015-2016 
  Educational Outcomes:  
     Freshman On-track Rate 
     Dropout Rate  
 
Race (by %):  
    White  
    Black  
    Latino   
   
Racial Density Index  
 
Demographic Controls (by %):  
    Bilingual 
    IEP 
    Economically Disadvantaged  
 
% Misconduct Resulting in a…  
    ISS 
    OSS 
    Police Notification  
 
Number of Students Expelled 
 
Number of Misconduct by Level: 
Low Level 
Mid Level 
High Level 
 
Total Punishment Ratio 
Low Punishment Ratio 
Mid Punishment Ratio 
High Punishment Ratio 
 
Suspension Ratio 
Low Suspension Ratio 
Mid Suspension Ratio 
High Suspension Ratio  
 
Police Notif. Ratio 
Low Police Ratio 
Mid Police Ratio  
High Police Ratio  
 
 
81 
82 
 
 
85 
85 
85 
 
85 
 
 
85 
85 
85 
 
 
85 
85 
85 
 
85 
 
 
85 
85 
85 
 
85 
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Table 2. Preliminary Step-wise Regressions for Misconduct-Total Punishment Ratio  
 (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
VARIABLES Dropout FOT Dropout FOT Dropout FOT Dropout FOT 
Total Punishment Ratio  -0.208 1.184** -0.0578 0.716 -0.0186 0.424 0.0668 0.353 
 (0.169) (0.500) (0.166) (0.491) (0.166) (0.479) (0.150) (0.461) 
# Expelled  0.478*** -1.217*** 0.375*** -0.933*** 0.346*** -0.744** 0.258*** -0.626** 
 (0.110) (0.324) (0.107) (0.317) (0.107) (0.309) (0.0979) (0.300) 
Time Trend  -0.0708 0.323 -0.0686 0.318 -0.0625 0.275 -0.215 0.534 
 (0.163) (0.482) (0.157) (0.465) (0.156) (0.450) (0.144) (0.442) 
Black    0.0538*** -0.180***     
   (0.0139) (0.0412)     
Latino    0.0261* -0.116**     
   (0.0158) (0.0468)     
Racial Density      6.261 -0.711   
     (11.32) (32.68)   
Black Majority      1.014 3.723   
     (2.363) (6.818)   
Latino Majority     3.032 -12.22*   
     (2.272) (6.557)   
Racial Density*Black      -1.224 -22.74   
     (11.47) (33.10)   
Racial Density*Latino      -6.271 2.746   
     (11.47) (33.12)   
IEP        0.373*** -0.726*** 
       (0.0354) (0.109) 
Bilingual       -0.0141 -0.00184 
       (0.0318) (0.0974) 
Econ Disad        0.00302 -0.169*** 
       (0.0153) (0.0468) 
Constant 4.556*** 78.43*** 0.705 92.44*** 0.460 91.69*** -1.062 104.4*** 
 (0.621) (1.831) (1.443) (4.269) (2.148) (6.198) (1.361) (4.171) 
         
Observations 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 
R-squared 0.050 0.051 0.121 0.117 0.134 0.173 0.279 0.223 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Regressions for Misconduct-Total Punishment Ratio  
 (5) (5) (6) (6) (7) (7) (8) (8) 
VARIABLES Dropout FOT LagDropout LagFOT Dropout FOT LagDropout LagFOT 
Total Punishment Ratio 0.115 0.154 0.287* -0.159     
 (0.147) (0.446) (0.170) (0.458)     
Low Punish Ratio     0.0823 0.798 0.108 0.449 
     (0.205) (0.620) (0.237) (0.637) 
Mid Punish Ratio     0.548 -2.718* 1.124** -2.771* 
     (0.468) (1.414) (0.544) (1.467) 
High Punish Ratio      -2.531 8.365 -2.273 6.687 
     (1.703) (5.143) (2.018) (5.438) 
# Expulsions  0.175* -0.322 0.00827 0.0520 0.165* -0.299 0.00220 0.0658 
 (0.0970) (0.294) (0.112) (0.303) (0.0970) (0.293) (0.112) (0.302) 
Time Trend  -0.277** 0.639 -0.202 0.453 -0.279** 0.643 -0.202 0.454 
 (0.141) (0.427) (0.162) (0.437) (0.140) (0.424) (0.162) (0.435) 
Racial Density 0.978 12.22** -2.363 11.40** 1.305 10.77** -1.934 10.13** 
 (1.657) (5.019) (1.906) (5.141) (1.666) (5.032) (1.916) (5.162) 
Black Majority -0.698 16.43*** -2.359 14.86*** -0.772 16.73*** -2.443 15.09*** 
 (1.298) (3.933) (1.497) (4.038) (1.295) (3.911) (1.493) (4.023) 
IEP 0.117 -0.611** 0.168* -0.704*** 0.117 -0.639*** 0.178* -0.739*** 
 (0.0817) (0.247) (0.0946) (0.255) (0.0818) (0.247) (0.0946) (0.255) 
Bilingual 0.175*** -0.562*** 0.0760 -0.396** 0.181*** -0.581*** 0.0789 -0.404** 
 (0.0504) (0.153) (0.0592) (0.160) (0.0504) (0.152) (0.0590) (0.159) 
Econ Disad -0.0330 -0.129** 0.0416* -0.147** -0.0414* -0.104 0.0340 -0.127* 
 (0.0216) (0.0654) (0.0248) (0.0669) (0.0222) (0.0671) (0.0255) (0.0687) 
Racial Density*Black Maj -0.273 -34.71*** 1.938 -31.43*** -0.347 -34.59*** 1.924 -31.41*** 
 (2.686) (8.137) (3.093) (8.342) (2.679) (8.089) (3.082) (8.305) 
IEP*Percentage Black 0.00313*** 0.00101 0.00220* 0.00224 0.00318*** 0.00109 0.00214* 0.00245 
 (0.00107) (0.00323) (0.00123) (0.00333) (0.00107) (0.00322) (0.00123) (0.00332) 
         
Constant 2.271 98.50*** -1.756 100.3*** 2.944* 97.58*** -1.457 99.82*** 
 (1.536) (4.651) (1.786) (4.816) (1.640) (4.953) (1.905) (5.133) 
Observations 422 422 420 420 422 422 420 420 
R-squared 0.319 0.283 0.230 0.225 0.323 0.291 0.236 0.232 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Regressions for Misconduct-Suspensions Ratio  
 (5) (5) (6) (6) (7) (7) (8) (8) 
VARIABLES Dropout FOT LagDropout LagFOT Dropout FOT LagDropout LagFOT 
Suspension Ratio  0.0101 0.0234 0.00914 0.00410     
$   (0.0222) (0.0673) (0.0257) (0.0691)     
Low Suspension Ratio     0.0560 0.718 0.0791 0.407 
     (0.186) (0.562) (0.215) (0.579) 
Mid Suspension Ratio     0.403 -2.069** 0.443 -1.498 
     (0.298) (0.901) (0.351) (0.944) 
High Suspension Ratio      -2.403* 8.129** -2.753* 6.307 
     (1.338) (4.042) (1.591) (4.279) 
# Expulsions  0.172* -0.325 -6.12e-05 0.0572 0.162* -0.290 -0.00986 0.0812 
 (0.0970) (0.294) (0.113) (0.303) (0.0967) (0.292) (0.112) (0.302) 
Time Trend  -0.276* 0.636 -0.190 0.442 -0.281** 0.631 -0.193 0.435 
 (0.141) (0.427) (0.163) (0.438) (0.141) (0.425) (0.162) (0.437) 
Racial Density  0.960 12.23** -2.469 11.48** 1.246 11.13** -2.161 10.69** 
 (1.658) (5.020) (1.912) (5.142) (1.660) (5.013) (1.914) (5.151) 
Black Majority  -0.611 16.56*** -2.182 14.77*** -0.762 16.87*** -2.362 15.04*** 
 (1.296) (3.925) (1.500) (4.033) (1.294) (3.909) (1.498) (4.030) 
IEP 0.118 -0.608** 0.165* -0.700*** 0.116 -0.619** 0.167* -0.715*** 
 (0.0819) (0.248) (0.0951) (0.256) (0.0817) (0.247) (0.0948) (0.255) 
Bilingual 0.175*** -0.562*** 0.0748 -0.396** 0.181*** -0.582*** 0.0786 -0.403** 
 (0.0505) (0.153) (0.0594) (0.160) (0.0504) (0.152) (0.0592) (0.159) 
Econ Disad -0.0333 -0.129** 0.0406 -0.146** -0.0416* -0.102 0.0313 -0.125* 
 (0.0216) (0.0654) (0.0249) (0.0669) (0.0220) (0.0664) (0.0253) (0.0682) 
Racial Density*Black Maj -0.344 -34.80*** 1.780 -31.34*** -0.364 -34.58*** 1.811 -31.31*** 
 (2.686) (8.132) (3.101) (8.339) (2.676) (8.080) (3.090) (8.314) 
IEP*Percentage Black 0.00310*** 0.000944 0.00215* 0.00225 0.00320*** 0.000876 0.00221* 0.00227 
 (0.00107) (0.00324) (0.00124) (0.00333) (0.00107) (0.00322) (0.00124) (0.00333) 
         
Constant 2.479* 98.71*** -1.113 99.91*** 3.123** 96.57*** -0.412 98.31*** 
 (1.503) (4.549) (1.751) (4.708) (1.539) (4.647) (1.791) (4.818) 
Observations 422 422 420 420 422 422 420 420 
R-squared 0.318 0.283 0.225 0.225 0.323 0.292 0.231 0.229 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Regressions for Misconduct-Police Notification Ratio  
 (5) (5) (6) (6) (7) (7) (8) (8) 
VARIABLES Dropout FOT LagDropout LagFOT Dropout FOT LagDropout LagFOT 
Police Notif Ratio  0.00198** -0.00469* -0.00186* 0.00238     
 (0.000946) (0.00285) (0.00111) (0.00299)     
Low Police Ratio      0.00337*** -0.00605* -0.00194 -0.00202 
     (0.00112) (0.00341) (0.00133) (0.00357) 
Mid Police Ratio     0.000923 -0.00687 0.00244 0.0138 
     (0.00485) (0.0147) (0.00564) (0.0151) 
High Police Ratio      -0.0538** 0.0708 -0.0262 0.120 
     (0.0259) (0.0784) (0.0301) (0.0806) 
# Expulsions  0.187* -0.369 -0.0412 0.111 0.163 -0.341 -0.0441 0.172 
 (0.101) (0.304) (0.117) (0.315) (0.101) (0.305) (0.117) (0.314) 
Time Trend  -0.283* 0.700 -0.156 0.451 -0.283* 0.694 -0.149 0.484 
 (0.151) (0.454) (0.173) (0.467) (0.150) (0.454) (0.174) (0.464) 
Racial Density  0.701 13.18** -2.418 11.13** 0.979 12.72** -2.180 10.73* 
 (1.795) (5.401) (2.069) (5.567) (1.792) (5.434) (2.083) (5.573) 
Black Majority  -1.092 17.87*** -2.290 15.16*** -0.747 17.54*** -2.315 14.13*** 
 (1.392) (4.188) (1.608) (4.327) (1.388) (4.210) (1.616) (4.323) 
IEP 0.133 -0.740*** 0.221** -0.818*** 0.128 -0.731*** 0.216** -0.827*** 
 (0.0909) (0.274) (0.105) (0.283) (0.0903) (0.274) (0.105) (0.282) 
Bilingual 0.173*** -0.547*** 0.0482 -0.357** 0.168*** -0.546*** 0.0528 -0.331* 
 (0.0539) (0.162) (0.0635) (0.171) (0.0538) (0.163) (0.0638) (0.171) 
EconDisad  -0.0373 -0.122* 0.0416 -0.132* -0.0364 -0.122* 0.0391 -0.139* 
 (0.0239) (0.0718) (0.0274) (0.0738) (0.0238) (0.0722) (0.0276) (0.0739) 
Racial Density*Black Maj  0.290 -37.34*** 2.098 -33.69*** -0.140 -36.87*** 2.062 -32.69*** 
 (2.920) (8.787) (3.365) (9.056) (2.898) (8.789) (3.365) (9.003) 
IEP*Percentage Black 0.00301*** 0.00220 0.00168 0.00406 0.00302*** 0.00214 0.00172 0.00426 
 (0.00117) (0.00351) (0.00135) (0.00363) (0.00116) (0.00351) (0.00135) (0.00361) 
         
Constant 2.716 98.99*** -1.399 99.04*** 2.823* 98.80*** -1.297 98.96*** 
 (1.697) (5.108) (1.972) (5.308) (1.685) (5.110) (1.974) (5.280) 
Observations 390 390 389 389 390 390 389 389 
R-squared 0.321 0.276 0.226 0.203 0.333 0.278 0.227 0.214 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
